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Introduction
The analysis of the non-governmental aid sector by development economists is still at an
early stage. Other social sciences, notably sociology and political science, have debated
the advantages and disadvantages of providing foreign aid through NGOs at length.
Compared to official aid, this literature often claims that NGOs are closer to the needs
of beneficiaries, more innovative, and less influenced by geopolitical interests (Edwards
and Hulme, 1996; Bebbington et al., 2008). NGOs also came under fire: critics accused
the sector of being uncoordinated, ideology-driven, ingenuous, or even ill-intentioned
(Petras, 1997; Mercer, 2002; Roy, 2004).
For more than half a century, cross-country analysis tried – unsuccessfully – to assess
if aggregated foreign aid leads poor countries to development. Today, economists can
rigorously test how successful the intervention of an individual NGO is, in particular
thanks to randomized controlled trials. There is no middle ground: the disconnection
between individual projects and cross-country analysis incarnates a modern version of
Mosley’s Micro-Macro paradox (Mosley, 1986). The paradox, stated almost 30 years
ago, observes that despite the apparent success of foreign aid at the project level,
aggregate effects where invisible at the country level. There is a pressing need to
understand if the overall impact of the NGO sector is equal to the sum of its parts.
This raises the following questions: how do NGOs influence those that do not directly
benefit from their projects? How do NGOs interact with each other, with governments,
or with other components of the Civil Society? How do NGOs change market equilibria,
influence vote, or impact productivity?
Answering these questions is crucial to assess the efficiency of the new landscape of
development assistance. This doctoral thesis hopes to contribute to the knowledge on
NGOs by theorizing on their impact at the level of a country, or a large region of a
country. The thesis is composed of three chapters: two of them are theoretical models
concerned with the political economy of developing countries hosting foreign NGOs;
the third chapter combines a theoretical model with empirical evidence to assess the
effect of specific policies designed by governments, which it outsources to NGOs for
their implementation.
The first chapter, Decentralized Aid and Democracy, develops a theoretical model in
which a large operational NGO provides a public good in a democracy. It shows that
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this type of aid provides incentives to voters to reduce support for taxation and redis-
tribution. Poor citizens not targeted by the NGO suffer from reduced electoral support
for redistribution. The chapter characterizes conditions under which decentralized aid
can be harmful to poor non-beneficiaries.
A natural follow-up to exploring the effect of decentralized aid in democracies is to
explore its effect under autocratic regimes. The second chapter, Advocacy NGOs, co-
authored with Elena Serfilippi, looks at advocacy NGOs confronted to a high-handed
ruler. We discuss the conditions under which advocacy activities can grant new rights
to the poor. We find that NGOs will sub-optimally provide advocacy activities because
they convey the characteristics of a public good. NGOs can solve under-provision issues
through coordination, but if a ruler who is unwilling to grant new rights anticipates
this, he will not allow the NGO sector to thrive under his rule. It results that full
coordination among NGOs is suboptimal for their beneficiaries.
While in the previous case coordination among NGOs might be suboptimal, the
reality is that NGOs do not usually coordinate: they often compete with each other. In
chapter 3, Encouraging Private Ownership of Public Goods: Theory and Evidence from
Belgium, we look at the market for land in Belgium, in which NGOs compete for land
purchases with the view of creating natural reserves. This chapter is co-authored with
Gani Aldashev, Franc¸ois Libois, and Astrid Similon. We look at the introduction of a
subsidy to land purchases by NGOs in the Wallon region. While the subsidy initially
increases the price of land, in the long-run prices fall, and land purchases thrive. We
posit that NGOs can convince sellers to accept lower prices in exchange for contributing
to a ‘good cause’; incentives affect market equilibria for nonprofits in ways that diverge
greatly from their for-profit counterpart.
Chapter 1
Decentralized Aid and Democracy
Abstract
This paper uses a model of vote over public finances to show that when nongovern-
mental organisations deliver development aid, beneficiaries have incentives to reduce
electoral support for state-led redistribution. As a result, NGOs can crowd out govern-
mental spending, turning private aid into a negative externality for the poor who do
not directly benefit from it. I model the choice of a representative NGO, which faces
a trade-off between targeting beneficiaries with higher needs, and reducing costs. I
characterize the conditions under which this targeting affects the size of the externality
and describe how it affects the welfare of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
JEL Classification: D72, H44, L31, L33, O19.
Keywords : private development assistance, democracy, governance, NGOs, nonprofits,
foreign aid, taxation, public goods.
1.1 Introduction
International NGOs, foundations, philanthropies, and other private nonprofits play an
increasingly important role in the new landscape of foreign development assistance.
Worthington and Pipa (2011) estimate that in 2008, private aid reached $49 billion,
around a third of total aid disbursed by member states of the OECD. Donor countries
have substantially outsourced their development assistance to NGOs: from negligible
amounts in the mid-eighties, today 15% of all official aid is channelled through NGOs
(OCDE, 2011).
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The privatization of aid has been severely understudied by economists (a few ex-
ceptions are Yontcheva and Masud (2005); Dreher et al. (2007); Koch (2007)). On the
contrary, scholars from other disciplines, including sociology and the political sciences,
have produced an abundant literature on the political repercussions of nongovernmen-
tal aid (Arellano-Lo´pez and Petras, 1994; Petras, 1997; Lorgen, 1998; Mercer, 2002).
These authors claim that NGOs promoted the disengagement of the state in emerging
democracies by encroaching on the prerogatives of the State. This literature asserts that
when external private actors provide social services, they undermine the accountability
of the State towards its citizens.
Many emerging markets deal with the issue of consolidating democracy while strug-
gling with persisting pockets of poverty. As these countries become on average richer,
they also turn less eligible to benefit from bilateral or multilateral aid. However, be-
cause they still struggle with inequality and large impoverished sectors of society, many
nongovernmental organizations are willing to cater to the poor, sometimes acting as
surrogates of the state. India is the prime example of an emerging market and a con-
solidated democracy in which NGOs are overwhelmingly present at all levels of society.
Brazil, South Africa, and other poor-to-middle income democracies are no different. It
is worth exploring how does the private provision of aid affects the role of the govern-
ment in democracies.
I build upon Anthony Downs (1957) model of vote over public finances to show that
private aid can reduce electoral support for redistribution. When NGOs provide services
substitutable to those provided by the government, any voter benefiting from a project
would favour a low taxation-low expenditure policy platform. Voters have incentives to
do so because while foreign donors finance NGOs, national taxes finance governmental
services. Therefore, for a similar service a citizen can afford to pay fewer taxes. By
skewing the distribution of preferred policies toward a smaller government, private
aid pulls the median voter away from poor non-beneficiaries. As a result, the preferred
policies of poor non-beneficiaries become more distant from the new equilibrium policy:
private aid turns into a negative externality for the poor, and into a positive externality
for the rich.
This externality is independent from assumptions on corrupt authorities, devious
NGO managers, or geopolitical interests. Instead, aid provided by NGOs can have un-
desirable effects even in the absence of institutional dysfunctions. Modelling emerging
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democracies as endowed with perfect institutional environments is unrealistic, but it
leads us to the important conclusion that good institutions are not enough to guaran-
tee the efficiency of NGO-delivered aid. Additional institutional imperfections would
mostly reinforce the validity of the main findings.
The crucial assumption driving the results of the model is that, contrary to the
state, the NGO is not accountable to all society. In words, it is institutionally and
politically easier for the NGO to target specific sectors of the population, while the
state in bounded by the fact that it is accountable to all taxpayers. If non-recipients of
a project feel that the state has unfairly allocated resources to other groups, they can
punish politicians either at the pooling stations, in the streets, or by refusing to pay
taxes. However, if and NGO allocates a project to some group, there is not much that
non-recipients can do to punish the organization.
The model contributes to the debate over the private provision of aid. It theoret-
ically quantifies the effects of a private and non-coordinated project on governmental
expenditures and taxation. Because NGO targets a specific fraction of the population,
it can choose between prioritizing the size of its project, and targeting would-be ben-
eficiaries with higher needs. The underlying assumption is that reaching the poor is
costlier, due to access costs to remote locations, saliency of needs, hostile environments,
etc.
For instance, an education NGO could decide to implement alphabetization pro-
grammes. To obtain the same result in terms of beneficiaries reached and quality of
alphabetization, the NGO endure higher costs by targeting isolated native communities
than by targeting the urban middle classes, which have already some formal instruc-
tion. This type of trade-off will be determinant in understanding how different types
of projects affect the governmental provision of public goods.
The main findings of the paper are:
(i) private aid crowds out governmental expenditures, harming poor non-recipients
most;
(ii) targeting poorer beneficiaries mitigates the effect of this externality on poor non-
beneficiaries; and
(iii) an utilitarian social welfare function is maximized by targeting poorer-than-average
individuals when aid resources are limited;
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: section 2 positions this paper in the relevant
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literature; section 3 sets up the model, which is solved in section 4; section 5 analyses
welfare implications; and section 6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Surprisingly few studies on aid efficiency categorize outcomes by type of development
assistance, private or official. Empirical evidence on the topic suffers from chronic
data unavailability (Kharas, 2007). Databases contain information either at the donor
country level (Dreher et al., 2007), or are estimated based on governmental subsidies
granted to NGOs (Yontcheva and Masud, 2005; Yontcheva and Nancy, 2006), keeping
private donations unaccounted. This is troublesome because official founding to NGOs
is but a small fraction of the overall budget of these agencies, and there is large variation
in the origins of founds across organizations and donor countries (Navarra, 2013). These
limitations hamper the empirical assessments concerning the effectiveness of private aid.
Theoretical analysis of the private provision of public goods has been more fruit-
ful. Drawing back from the literature of nonprofits based on transaction cost theories
(Hansmann, 1980; Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Weisbrod, 1986), this literature has recently
been updated to include elements of behavioural economics (Andreoni and Payne, 2001;
Scharf, 2014) and applications to development economics (Besley and Ghatak, 2001a,
2005a; Aldashev and Verdier, 2010). The present paper adds to this last strand of
literature by looking at the political repercussions of projects financed by private aid.
By doing so, it should help bridge the gap between the effects of aid at the project
level and its consequences at the country level. Indeed, while project evaluation tech-
niques become increasingly sophisticated (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011a), our knowledge of
the overall impact of micro-projects at the macro level remains limited (Mosley, 1986;
Deaton, 2009).
Political economy models have been the predominant tool to address the repercus-
sions of official development assistance at the state level (Svensson, 2000; Acemoglu
et al., 2003; Platteau et al., 2011). Few of them address directly the question of private
aid. Azam and Laffont (2003) model NGOs founded by the local elite in a dysfunc-
tional democracy. By contrast, the present paper explores NGOs founded by foreign
donors, and operating in countries endowed with sound institutions. The setting in this
paper allows addressing the question of the privatization of international aid, and of
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the inefficiencies arising even when institutional dysfunctions are absent.
This paper hopes to provide microfoundations explaining some of the paradoxical
results found in the empirical literature on overall aid effectiveness. Good institutions
have been deemed as a necessary condition to have aid affect growth (Burnside and
Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2004). However, foreign aid has been found to deteri-
orate governance (Rajan and Subramanian, 2007, 2008; Djankov et al., 2008), and to
aggravate inequalities (Layton and Fuller, 2008; Herzer and Nunnenkamp, 2012). In
countries with good institutions, we have that aid fosters growth but also widens in-
equality. In particular, Bjørnskov (2010) finds that if a recipient country is a democracy,
then aid increases inequality. All these results are consistent with the model presented
here. However, one must be cautious that the aforementioned empirical studies look
at aid in general and not at aid provided specifically by NGOs. We do not know what
type of aid, official or private, is at the origin of this divergence between efficiency and
fairness. Koch et al. (2009) find that NGOs typically follow official aid; because of this
positive correlation, we cannot rule out that indeed private aid hampers fairness.
1.3 Set up of the Model
1.3.1 The Basic Model of Vote over Public Finances
The model builds on the framework proposed by Anthony Downs (1957). Consider a
continuum of voters indexed i, each of whom detains income yi. Incomes are distributed
according to a uniform distribution function with support [0, 1].
Any voter values private consumption, c, and a public good, G. Their pay-off func-
tion is
ωi(c,G) = c+G− G
2
2
. (1.1)
In it, welfare increases linearly with private consumption, and increases in the level of
the public good, but with diminishing marginal returns1.
The public good is financed through a flat tax τ on income such that G = τ
∫
i
yidi =
τ . After taxation, agent i has a disposable income (1−τ)yi which she devotes to private
1In equilibrium, G will never be in the decreasing part this functional form; monotonicity of G is preserved
in the relevant domain. The quadratic form provides useful closed-form solutions.
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consumption. Any citizen i chooses her preferred policy, denoted Gi, such that
Gi = arg max
G
(1−G) yi +G− G
2
2
.
The preferred policy of i is
Gi = 1− yi. (1.2)
Poor voters will prefer a higher level of public good and therefore higher taxation.
Given the tax rate is flat, poor agents gain more from high taxation levels, as it forces
rich agents to contribute proportionally more to the public good. The monotonous
relation between income share and preferred policies allows us to draw a uniform dis-
tribution of preferred policies G with support [0, 1]. Denote the associated cumulative
distribution function is F (Gi) = Gi with support [0, 1]. Following Persson and Tabellini
(2002, p.21-23), if politicians care only about getting elected, and citizens only care
about public finances, then the median voter theorem predicts that the outcome policy
is
G∗ = 1/2 (1.3)
in which 1/2 is the income of the median voter. For any agent poorer than the
median voter, the provision of public good by the state is insufficient. Agents richer
than the median consider that there is too much taxation.
1.3.2 Nongovernmental Organizations
Introduce an NGO to the model. Formally speaking, the NGO provides a local public
good, denoted g, to a targeted fraction n of the population. The NGO is averse to
poverty, so that targeting richer agents reduces its utility. The programme of the NGO
is
Max
n,g,yt
ng
yt
2( 1−z2−z )
s.t b ≥ (n+ g) 1
1+yt
(1.4)
where z ∈]0, 1] denotes aversion to poverty. The payoff of the NGO is larger if it reaches
more beneficiaries (n) and if the level of the public good is higher (g). yt represents the
income of a typical targeted beneficiary, such that targeting richer individuals decreases
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its utility. Since yt < 1, an increase in parameter z increases the exponent over yt,
and therefore raises the disutility from targeting richer individuals. It follows that
z measures aversion to poverty. The NGO finances its project with budget b, which
allows it to finance a larger project g and to reach more beneficiaries n. I assume that
the cost of these endeavours increases as the NGO targets poorer individuals. Indeed,
poorer individuals might be harder to reach, for example if most of them live in remote
locations, or if their needs are more salient. Notice that if this assumption does not
hold, the NGO trivially targets only the poorest due to poverty aversion. The solution
of this program is
y∗t = 1− z
n∗ =
(
1− z
2
)
b
g∗ =
(
1− z
2
)
b
(1.5)
Appendix A provides the details. The first condition states that poverty-averse
NGOs target poorer individuals. This comes at the cost of reducing the level of the
public good provided as well as the number of beneficiaries reached, as stated in the
following conditions. I impose the restriction that b < 1 to avoid corner solutions; it
should be noted however that because national income is 1, this restriction is not too
demanding. A larger budget allows the NGO to invest more in both reach and depth
of the project. By (1.2), the typical beneficiary of the NGO is the agent with preferred
policy
Gt = z.
Dropping the asterisks to alleviate notation, vector (n, g, z) represents the charac-
teristics of the project. A fraction n of the population is a continuum of beneficiaries
lying in the neighbourhood of targeted beneficiary z. Identify the poorest amongst all
beneficiaries with G and the richest with G, which are their respective preferred poli-
cies. Then n = G−G. Any agent within this interval is a beneficiary: she gets access
to g, additionally to the public good G provided by the state. To obtain a well-behaved
solution, assume the following:
Allocation Rule For any given program vector (n, g, z) there is an allocation rule such
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that:
G = z(1− n) + n, and
G = z(1− n). (1.6)
This assumption prevents the NGO from targeting beneficiaries out of the domain. We
now turn to characterize the equilibrium following the introduction of this project.
1.4 Electoral Outcomes at Equilibrium
The timing of the model is as follows: project (g, n) is implemented; beneficiaries update
their preferred policy platform; and elections take place. The updated preferred policy
for any voter is
Ĝi = arg max
G
(1−G)yi +G+ ga− (G+ ga)
2
2
in which a is an indicator variable valued one if the voter is a beneficiary of the
project. The ex-post preferred policy of voter i, designated with a circumflex accent
throughout this paper, is
Ĝi = min{0, 1− yi − ga}
= min{0, Gi − ga}
(1.7)
The mass of voters with political preferences distributed over the segment [G,G]
shifts to the left (directionally) by a distance g, as Figure 1.1 displays. Denote J(Gi)
the ex-post cumulative distribution function (CDF), which can be expressed in terms
of G.
Proposition 1.1 Preferred Policies Ex-post
Equality J(G) = 1/2 defines the ex-post median voter Ĝ, in which
J(G∗) =

G if 0 ≤ G < G− g
2G− z + (1 + z)(1− z/2)b if G− g ≤ G < G
z + (1− z)(1− z/2)b if G ≤ G < G
G if G < G
(1.8)
is a piecewise differentiable, continuous and monotonically increasing function in G,
such that J(G) ≥ G. By the allocation rule described above, the three points at which
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the distribution changes slope are:
G− g = z − (1 + z)(1− z/2)b
G− g = G = z − z(1− z/2)b
G = z + (1− z)(1− z/2)b
(1.9)
Appendix B details the construction of this CDF. The lower right quadrant in Figure
1.1 depicts function J(G). The ex-ante cumulative distribution function is first order
stochastically dominant with respect to the ex-post CDF of preferred policies. The
median preferred level of public spending partially reduces except in three regimes
described in what follows.2
If the intercept is such that that if J(0) > 1/2, then there is full disruption of
government expenditure (as opposed to partial reduction). This happens when
b ≥ 2z + 1
(1 + z)(2− z) ; (1.10)
full disruption results from a very large aid budget and low poverty aversion. The
project of the NGO does not change electoral outcomes in two cases: when all benefi-
ciaries are richer than the ex-ante median (G < 1/2), and when beneficiaries are poor
but do not shift beyond the ex-ante median (G − g > 1/2). These Status Quo regimes
happen when
b ≤ 1− 2z
(1 + z)(2− z) (1.11)
or
b ≤ 2z − 1
(1 + z)(2− z) . (1.12)
There is no political impact when the budget is low, and when poverty aversion is either
very small or very high.
When conditions (1.10) to (1.12) are violated, there is a partial reduction of public
2The size of this shift depends on the assumption that state-provided and NGO-provided public goods
are perfectly substitutable. It will be lesser if the two goods are increasingly complementary, for example if
the utility function of beneficiaries is (1 − G)yi + G + gb − (G + gb)2/2 + αgG in which α parametrizes the
level of complementarity. The updated preferred policy of i is then Ĝi = Gi − (1 − α)gb. The distribution of
preferences shifts less as α increases. If α¿1, preferences shift to the right (directionally). The project crowds-in
public expenditure, but only if those richer than the median voter are beneficiaries, which is an anomalous
circumstance.
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Figure 1.1: Ex-ante and ex-post density distributions.
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spending. Define as isoelectoral curves the set of combinations of b and z such that the
same electoral outcome Ĝ is obtained at equilibrium. These are defined by J(G) = 1/2
when G− g < G < G. They can be expressed as
b =
1 + 2z − 4Ĝ
(1 + z)(2− z) (1.13)
Remark that (1.10) and (1.12) are the limit cases of the partial reduction regime.
These regimes are displayed in the z × b space in Figure 1.2, in which ϕ is the golden
ratio. The arrow over the isoelectoral outcome curves indicates the direction in which
the provision of public good by the state decreases. Figure 1.3 displays the levels of
electoral outcomes for the different regimes. In the partial reduction regime, provision
of the public good by the state decreases as the income of the NGO increases. However,
when the NGO is more averse to poverty it mitigates this effect.
b
z
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/ϕ
1
1
Status QuoStatus Quo
Full Disruption
Figure 1.2: Isoelectoral Outcomes depending on characteristics of the NGO.
Corollary 1.1 If the NGO crowds out public expenditure, a larger NGO budget exac-
erbates the effect, while aversion to poverty reduces the crowding out.
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Status Quo
1/2
1/2
1/ϕ
Figure 1.3: Levels of ex-post government expenditure for any z and b.
By targeting poorer agents, the NGO reduces the crowding out effect by two means:
first, it reduces the size of the shift because the projects are smaller due to accessibility
costs; secondly, beneficiaries are more likely to remain to the right of the ex-ante median
voter if they are poorer. Targeting the middle class is therefore conductive of a larger
shift. Next section analyses how this shift affects welfare at the individual and at the
aggregate level.
1.5 Welfare Implications
In this section, we analyse the effect of the shift on welfare, both at the individual and
at the aggregate level. We do so by comparing the ex-ante to the ex-post equilibria. I
use the utilitarian welfare function, which simply aggregates payoff functions. An the
ex-ante level, it writes∫
i
[
(1−G)yi +G− G
2
2
]
di = 1 +G−G2 (1.14)
since yi follows a uniform distribution.
3
The policy maximizing welfare is the equilibrium policy G∗ = 1/2. This result obtains
3Given that incomes are uniformely distributed and ranked by i, one can write yi = i/α in which [0, α] is
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when the distribution is symmetrical around the mean, because mean and median
coincide. The mean preferred policy maximizes welfare since it minimizes the sum of
the distances between the individually preferred policies and the implemented outcome.
Therefore, deviations from this equilibrium reduce welfare. The NGO brings the direct
benefits from the project itself, while it creates the cost of deviating from the optimal
government policy. We explore this trade-off in what follows.
1.5.1 Individual Welfare
Remark that at the ex-ante equilibrium G∗ = 1/2. The payoff of voter i is by (1.14)
yi/2 + 3/8. (1.15)
If the project is to be beneficial to voter i, this payoff must be smaller than
(1− Ĝ∗)yi + Ĝ∗ + ga− (Ĝ
∗ + ga)2
2
. (1.16)
Proposition 1.2 If a project is implemented and it crowds out public expenditure, then
1. non-beneficiaries poorer than the median are always made worse-off,
2. non-beneficiaries richer than the third quartile are always made better-off, and
3. beneficiaries are always made better-off.
To see this, first consider the welfare of the non-beneficiaries by setting a = 0.
We can trace a set of points of indifference in which (1.15) equals (1.16) for any i.
This yields the simple relation
yi =
3− 2Ĝ
4
.
Plotting this function in Figure 1.4 we define two sets: the set above the indiffer-
ence line contains rich non-beneficiaries, for whom the project is a positive external-
ity; the set below contains poor non-beneficiaries, for whom the project is a negative
the support of i. Then ∫
i
yidi =
α∫
i=0
i
α
di =
α
2
Since
∫
i
yidi = 1, one obtains α = 2. Therefore,
∫
i
(constant) di = 2 × constant.
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Figure 1.4: Welfare changes for non-beneficiaries.
externality. When the vertical distance
between yi and the line increase, utility
reduces. In the graph, the individual with
income y1 becomes closer to this line when
there is a shift, while the distance of indi-
vidual y3 increases. Any individual richer
than yi ≥ 3/4 is unambiguously made bet-
ter off, and the converse is true for any
agent poorer than y ≤ 1/2. For an individ-
ual with income 1/2 < y2 < 3/4 the effect is
ambiguous; while initially she prefers less
public spending, if the project leads to a
shift that is too large (as represented in
Figure 1.4), she prefers the ex-ante equi-
librium.
The shift exacerbates inequalities
amongst non-beneficiaries. By corollary 1.1, poor non-beneficiaries welfare decreases in
the budget of the NGO, but the effect is mitigated when aversion to poverty increases.
Turn now to the beneficiaries of the project. When the NGO implement it, benefi-
ciaries gain from the project but lose from the externality. To see that the net effect
is positive, consider the poorest among all agents, yi = 0, who suffers most from the
externality. She is better off with the project when
Ĝ∗ + g − (Ĝ∗+g)2
2
> G∗ − G∗2
2
⇒ Ĝ∗ + g > G∗ (1.17)
since we are in the increasing part of the quadratic function. By (1.3), (1.5) and (1.13),
this condition is rearranged as
B >
1− 2z
(2− z)(1− z)
which by (1.10) is respected when we are outside of the Satus Quo case. In the Status
Quo case, (1.16) holds trivially. Hence, even for the poorest beneficiary, the negative
exernality cost does not surpass the direct benefits from the project.
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1.5.2 Aggregate Welfare
Dropping the asterisk of Ĝ∗ to alleviate notation, the sum of all payoff functions is
W =
∫
i
[
(1− Ĝ)yi + Ĝ+ ga− (Ĝ+ ga)
2
2
]
di
= 1− Ĝ︸ ︷︷ ︸
After Tax
Income
+n
[
2(Ĝ+ g)− (Ĝ+ g)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of the public good
for Beneficiaries
+ (1− n)
[
2Ĝ− Ĝ2
]
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of the public good
for Non-Beneficiaries
(1.18)
The first term is aggregate disposable income after taxation, the second term is the
utility of the combined public good for the beneficiaries, and the third term is the utility
of the state-provided public good for non-beneficiaries. In the case of the partial shift,
equations (1.5) and (1.13) give the values of Ĝ and g depending on z and b. Therefore,
we can write W as a function of parameters z and b,
W : (z, b)→ R+
The analytical form of this equation is unsuitable for interpretation.4 Mathematical
software allows us to plot three sets of interest in the z × b space:
A = {(z, b) : W (z, b) < 5/8}
B = {(z, b) : Wb(z, b) < 0}
C = {(z, b) : Wz(z, b) > 0}
(1.19)
The properties of these sets are: A determines values of (z, b) for which aggregate
welfare is smaller than at the ex-ante equilibrium; B determines the region in which
aggregate welfare decreases with the budget of the NGO; and C determines region for
which aggregate welfare increases with aversion to poverty.
Figure 1.5 plots these three sets. Notice that (A ∪ B) ⊆ {SatusQuo}, and are
therefore empty, given that the partial shift defines W (z, n). Set C is non-empty when
4W (z, b) = 1
2
+
[
1− 1
4
(1 + 2z − (1 + z)(2− z)b)] [ 1+2z−(1+z)(2−z)b
8
+ ((1 − z
2
)b)2
]
− 1
2
[
(1− z
2
)b
]3
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1/2
1/2
1/ϕ
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Full Disruption
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Cb˜
Figure 1.5: Effects of z and b on aggregate welfare.
b and z take “intermediary” values in the center of the graph. From any point in C,
an increase of z increases welfare until it reaches the north-eastern boundary of C.
This boundary defines the set of optimal z for any budget b < 1/2. When b > 1/2 then
aggregate welfare decreases in the degree of aversion to poverty. The arrows in the
graph indicate the directions in which welfare increases following a marginal change of
vector (z, b). These observations allow for the following proposition:
Proposition 1.3 If a project with characteristics (z, b) is implemented, then :
1. aggregate welfare is larger compared to the case in which there is no project (since
A is empty);
2. aggregate welfare is monotonically increasing in b (since B is empty),
3. aggregate welfare increases in z for “intermediary” values of z up to the north-east
boundary of C, and decreases afterwards.
Figure 1.6 plots function W (z, b) in the [0, 1]2 × R space, allowing to represent the
magnitude of the effects. For low values of b, if there is a shift, then targeting the poorer
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than the median (up to a point) is socially optimal even under an utilitarian welfare
criterion. This is remarkable because, by assuming that targeting the poorest increases
costs, one would expect that utilitarianism would recommend adopting the cheapest
alternative, irrespective of who is the beneficiary. Instead, targeting those poorer than
the median mitigates the externality which results from the deviation of the ex-ante
equilibrium.
Figure 1.6: Welfare function W (z, b)
.
From this utilitarian perspective, an optimal targeting policy is, for a budget below
threshold b˜ ≈ 0.27, to target increasingly poorer beneficiaries as aid money increases
along the east boundary of C in Figure 1.5. This threshold is unlikely to be crossed,
as it would represent more than half of national income
∫
i
yidi = 1/2). However, if
it is the case, as aid money increases, targeting obtains two optima along the north
boundary of C, and quickly collapses to z = 0 when b is above set C. At this point
the cost of targeting the poorest completely surpasses the benefits from mitigating
the externality.After the threshold, objectives of efficiency and fairness are opposed:
programs maximizing aggregate welfare will also create the largest externality, hurting
poor non-beneficiaries the most.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of vote over public finances interacted with the provision
of public services by a foreign NGO. The NGO can reduce electoral support for state-
provided public goods, because it delivers a project financed by external donors, while
taxpayers finance the state-provided public good. The NGO can target particular
sectors of the population, while the state is accountable to the entire population. It
results that the crowding out of government expenditures translates into an externality
for agents whom the NGO does not target. It follows that nongovernmental aid makes
poor non-beneficiaries worse-off.
In the model, a representative NGO trades-off between the size of the project it
finances and who benefits form it, as I assume that the NGO wishes to cater to the
poor, but that this is costlier than satisfying the needs of the wealthy. While aversion
to poverty results in higher costs, it mitigates the crowding out effect. The additional
cost of targeting the poorest are worth enduring as they lessen inequalities even for
non-beneficiaries and, to a degree, increase aggregated welfare by diminishing the size
of the externality.
The model rests on deliberately simplifying assumptions to show that, even without
institutional failures at the government level, non-governmental aid can harm the poor.
It sheds light on the problem of lack of coordination between NGOs and government,
and on the issues stemming from lack of ownership of aid by the recipient country.
Recipient countries can overcome the crowding out problem if private aid is integrated
in the electoral platform of the democratically elected government, so that there is no
externality arising.
The optimistic view on the institutional arrangements make recommendations of
this paper applicable to emerging democracies, which have an already consolidated
voting system and free elections, although are still exposed to persistent poverty and
inequalities. The model omits the advocacy role that NGOs often play, which affects
attitudes of citizens beyond economic incentives only. This limitation highlights the
importance of integrating the advocacy role of private foreign aid in the next generation
of models on aid effectiveness.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Appendix A
After log-linearisation of the objective function, the Lagrangian associated to this prob-
lem is
L(n, g, yt, λ) = ln(n) + ln(g)− 2
(
1− z
2− z
)
ln(yt) + λ
[
b− (n+ g) 1
1 + yt
]
First order conditions are
1
n
= λ
1
1 + yt
(1.20)
1
g
= λ
1
1 + yt
(1.21)
− 2
(
1− z
2− z
)
1
yt
= −λ(n+ g) 1
(1 + yt)2
(1.22)
(1.20) and (1.21) yield g = n. Replacing λ in (1.22) from either (1.20) or (1.22)
obtains
1− z
2− z =
yt
1 + yt
(1.23)
which states that 1− z = yt. Replacing yt in the budget constraint b = (n+ g) 11+yt
and using g = n yields the desired result.
1.7.2 Appendix B
By the assumption of uniformity, the ex-ante pdf is 1 on support [0, 1]. We can construct
each piece of the ex-post CDF as follows:
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J(G∗) =

G∫
0
1dG˜ if 0 ≤ G < G− g
G∫
G−g
2dG˜−
G−g∫
0
1dG˜ if G− g ≤ G < G
G∫
G
0dG˜−
[
G∫
G−g
2dG˜−
G−g∫
0
1dG˜
]
if G ≤ G < G
G∫
G
1dG˜−
[
G∫
G
0dG˜−
[
G∫
G−g
2dG˜−
G−g∫
0
1dG˜
]]
if G < G
(1.24)
Solving these integrals and replacing the values at the points at which the distribution
changes slope yields the desired result.
Chapter 2
Advocacy NGOs
Joint work with Elena Serfilippi
Abstract
We develop a theoretical model in which NGOs financed by foreign donors engage in
two types of activities in a developing country: service provision and advocacy. In the
model, service provision relieves poverty, but these aid resources risk embezzlement by
corrupt authorities. Advocacy can encourage the local population to demand more
transparency to the authorities, reducing embezzlement at the cost of investing fewer
efforts in direct poverty alleviation. We find that in general advocacy will be under-
provided because its benefit, improved governance, has the characteristics of a public
good. NGOs can remedy to this under-provision by coordinating their actions, but be-
cause this coordination threatens the rents of the local authorities, officials will respond
to coordination attempts by cracking down on NGOs. Full coordination is therefore
undesirable: crackdown of NGOs will be too strong, which reduces service provision
and hurts beneficiaries.
Keywords: NGOs, Autocracy, Advocacy, Campaining, Aid Effectiveness, Coordina-
tion.
JEL Codes: L3, F3, F5, O19.
2.1 Introduction
In the last few years, the international community has multiplied efforts directed at
improving foreign aid effectiveness. At the High Level Fora on Aid effectiveness (Paris,
2005; Accra, 2008; Busan 2011) , parts signing the agreements committed to transform
the landscape of development assistance. Participant countries pledged to involve local
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citizens into shaping development strategies, particularly through the explicit recog-
nition of Nongovernmental Organisations as pillars of the implementation of effective
aid. From being practically absent at the initial debates at the High Level Fora, NGOs
became formally recognised as ‘full and equal participants’ to the negotiations at the
Busan summit in 2011. Accompanying this formal recognition, donor countries have
considerably increased their financial support to NGOs: roughly one-fifth of all official
OECD aid money was delivered through NGOs in 2013, double of what it was just ten
years ago (OECD, 2014). When private donations are added, Worthington and Pipa
(2011) estimate that the amount of aid delivered by NGOs is roughly equal to that of
aid delivered through official channels.
2.1.1 The Challenge of Aid Harmonization
The increased reliance on the NGO sector raises the issue of coordination among organi-
zations evolving in a fractioned sector. At the High Level Fora on aid effectiveness, the
agreements stressed the importance of harmonizing aid among donors, without clearly
stating how this harmonization can be achieved. Relying on a decentralized, atom-
istic, and heterogeneous multitude of NGOs, each of them driven by their own intrinsic
objectives challenges the idea of harmonizing aid.The lack of coordination is one of
the main criticisms addressed to the NGO sector, of which Haiti is the most poignant
example. Likewise, relying on the NGO sector contradicts another engagement of the
donor community: to concede the ownership of development strategies financed through
foreign aid to beneficiary governments. NGOs often have objectives that are divergent,
if not opposed, to those of host governments. Examples include human rights associa-
tions defying repressive authorities, NGOs that advocate gender equality in patriarchal
societies, or environmental NGOs that oppose heavy infrastructure projects.
Recent years have seen a surge of tensions between high-handed rulers and the non-
governmental sector. Governments of countries such as Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Russia,
Egypt, and several others have stringently audited, fined, intimidated, and ultimately
expelled NGOs from their territories (The Economist, 2014). While rent-seeking au-
thorities can take advantage of the presence of service-providing NGOs, directly through
extortion or indirectly through the mismanagement of fungible public funds, they also
risk being confronted to a sector that encourages beneficiaries into demanding greater
accountability to the ruling elite. NGOs can allocate their resources between two activi-
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ties: the provision of poverty-alleviating services, such as health and education, and the
financing of advocacy activities. If effective, advocacy activities can motivate targeted
beneficiaries into appropriating aid projects that are intended for them. However, if
advocating for improved governance results in a crackdown on the aid sector, which
cripples the amounts of aid provided, then one wonders if it is worth for NGOs to
engage in advocacy at all.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature by explicitly modelling the trade-off be-
tween the provision of welfare-enhancing services and the engagement into governance-
enhan- cing advocacy. Two main assumptions drive our model: first, we assume that
the advocacy content of the activities of the NGO is not contractible ex-ante with
the host government. Second, we assume that the benefit of advocacy, namely im-
proved governance, has the characteristics of a public good, in that better governance
is non-rival and non-excludable. In our model, three types of agents interact: the host
government, NGOs, and the local population. In particular, we focus on the description
of the numerous choices and constraints that NGOs face: in our set-up, NGOs inter-
act with each other, with the local authorities, and with the local population. NGOs
look for an optimal allocation of their efforts between service provision and advocacy,
the latter of which brings upon the benefits of improved governance. We assume that
NGOs are heterogeneous in their incomes and their preferences towards advocacy, and
moreover, they can coordinate with each other.
Our results show that advocacy efforts will typically be under-provided because of
the public good characteristics of better governance. While free riding inefficiencies
undermine the provision of advocacy efforts, addressing this inefficiency through an
increased focus on governance, or through intensified coordination efforts, makes the
government strengthen its crackdown on NGOs. As a result, although some degree of
advocacy is desirable, increasing it to the point of abolishing free riding inefficiencies is
not optimal because corrupt authorities will react by shutting down too many NGOs
compared to a second-best optimum. We prove the existence of such a second-best
optimal degree of advocacy and we derive its properties, in particular its incompatibility
with a state where there is no free riding in advocacy. A direct policy implication is
that donors cannot – and should not – expect that all forms of free riding disappear,
at least not through a bottom-up approach only.
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2.1.2 Literature Review
Scholars in social sciences highlight the role of NGOs as promoters of good governance as
frequently as they emphasise their role as service providers, but rarely do they expose
the constraints faced by NGOs when they strive to empower people (Edwards and
Hulme, 1996). The economic literature outlines the potential comparative advantages
of nonprofits in the provision of public services relative to governments or for-profits
(Hansmann, 1980; Hart and Moore, 1998; Besley and Ghatak, 2001a, 2005a). The
literature dealing with the political economy of multilateral or bilateral foreign aid, can
be traced back at least half a century (Fei and Paauw, 1965; Mosley, 1986; Boone, 1996;
Acemoglu et al., 2003; Mekasha and Tarp, 2011). Studying the political economy of
foreign aid when it is provided by private nonprofits is, however, a relatively recent
endeavour (Fruttero and Gauri (2005); Barr and Fafchamps (2006); Fafchamps and
Owens (2009); Aldashev and Verdier (2010); Brass (2012), Chapter 1).
The literature on aid efficiency typically models the problem of aid allocation as a
principal–agent relationship between multilateral and bilateral donors (the principals)
and recipient governments (the agents). In this context, the literature claims that aid
conditionality and aid coordination are required to enhance the governance of recipient
countries (Svensson, 2000; Azam and Laffont, 2003; Torsvik, 2005; Bourguignon and
Platteau, 2012; Platteau et al., 2014). However, donors often lack credibility regarding
their willingness to coordinate and enforce sanctions, which challenges the feasibility of
this approach. Instead, many authors see in a bottom-up approach the most effective
way towards improved governance (Easterly, 2007; Banerjee and Duflo, 2011b). Indeed,
if donor countries cannot commit to demand governance improvements from the top,
then they should design a way of increasing the bargaining power of the grassroots from
the bottom. In order to do this, relying on the NGO sector appears as the most feasible
alternative. In practical terms, the Busan Partnership legitimates NGOs as vital service
providers and advocates of the poor, assigning them a double mission: to produce a
tangible output that relieves poverty, and to advocate institutional change that grants
new rights to the poor (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Bebbington et al., 2008).
Our paper presents the first attempt at modelling NGOs when they carry out both
advocacy efforts and service provision. In line with models of aid coordination, such as
those of Platteau et al. (2014) and Torsvik (2005), we consider a setting with multiple
donors and one government of a poor country. Their conclusion is that aid coordination
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is always desirable for beneficiaries of aid, although it can be costly and even detrimental
for donors. Focusing on the NGO sector brings about different conclusions. In our
setting, too much coordination can be detrimental not only to donors, but also to
beneficiaries. The main difference is that, unlike multilateral donors contracting with
governments, NGOs operate in the field. This feature means that NGOs interact with
the local population, must integrate local politics, and are constrained by the legislation
of the host country.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 3 sets and solves the basic model. Section 4
develops the model towards specifications in which NGOs are able to cooperate or have
political preferences. Section 5 discuses the model in light of its policy implications.
Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Basic Model
2.2.1 Set Up
Three types of players interact in this model. These are: the government of the host
country (denoted G), the citizens it governs (C), and a set of N NGOs willing to operate
in the country, indexed by i = {1, ..., n, .., N}. We assume that due to the atomistic
nature of the NGO sector, N is arbitrarily high.
Actions of the players occur in the following sequence: the government chooses the
number (n) of NGOs authorized to operate in the country ; once authorized, each NGO
has to decide how much of its exogenous budget bi it allocates between investing in
providing services (si) and investing in advocacy (vi); in the last step, citizens exposed
to advocacy and aware of the existence of projects can engage in costly appropriation
efforts (a), which allow them to obtain ownership over aid projects.
We define ‘appropriation efforts’ as any costly initiatives engaged by citizens, which
allow them to discourage embezzlement by government officials. Appropriation efforts
can take the form of protests, petitions, trials, votes for the opposition, or other similar
endeavours. Citizens obtain ownership of a share 0 < ω(a) ≤ 1 of aid projects si when
they engage in a level of effort a. To make matters simple, specify ownership gain
technology ω(a) as an isoelastic function up to a threshold a˜ such that
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ω(a) = κ(1 + a)
1
1+ρ if 0 < a < a˜
ω(a) = 1 if a ≥ a˜
with ρ ≥ 0, 0 < κ ≤ 1 and a˜ = κ−(1+ρ)−1. ρ measures the ability of the government
to withstand appropriation efforts without having to make concessions. κ marks the
baseline ownership level when there are no appropriation efforts. If at the baseline there
is full ownership (κ = 1), then there is no room for appropriation gains. Ownership
gains ω(a) are increasing and concave in a. The assumption of concavity guarantees
that there is an interior solution for a, and reflects a process of gradual gain of ownership
through more efficient appropriation efforts. A convex function would generate corner
solutions (either a = 0 or a = 1), more suited to model civil conflict or government
overthrows. In this paper, we maintain the focus on non-drastic changes.
The payoff function of the government writes
UG = [1− ω(a)] s. (2.1)
in which s = ΣNi si is the aggregate amount of aid invested in development projects. The
payoff of corrupt authorities increases with the amount of resources they can embezzle
and reduces with level of appropriation efforts exerted by citizens. Appropriation efforts
are costly, which we make explicit in the citizen’s payoff function:
UP = ω(a)s− a
vλ
(2.2)
in which v = Σivi are the aggregate advocacy efforts provided by the NGO sector.
Citizens benefit from the projects to the extent that they obtain actual ownership over
them. They can increase their ownership through appropriation efforts, made cheaper
by the NGO’s advocacy input. Advocacy reduces the marginal cost of petitioning the
government by providing informational, legal, political, or other types of intangible
assistance. The intangible nature of these services makes them both simultaneously
non-contractible and impossible to embezzle. The efficiency of advocacy efforts is vari-
able and depends on how convincing the arguments of the NGO are, and on the degree
to which beneficiaries are willing to listen. Parameter λ measures the ability of NGOs
to mobilize appropriation efforts through advocacy, with low values denoting low re-
sponsiveness of citizens to campaigning.
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The aforementioned payoff functions of both government and citizens are highly
stylized in order to concentrate attention in the modelling of the NGO sector. In the
benchmark case, the simplest payoff function for any NGO is
UNGOi = ω(a)si (2.3)
which it maximizes subject to the constraint bi = si + vi. In this simple case, an
NGO cares about the size of its own project and on the degree of ownership of the
project by its beneficiaries. While advocacy does not entail direct benefits, the NGO
understands that it drives the appropriation efforts of the beneficiaries, which in turn
makes the project more valuable. Through this section, we model NGOs as imperfectly
altruistic: they only care about the well-being created by their own project, but not
about the well-being created by the overall NGO sector. This assumption is relaxed in
the extensions.
CitizensNGOs
The Government
1− ω(a)
ω(a)
n
(Stage 1)
Σvi
(Stage 2)
Σsi
(Stage 2)
a
(Stage 3)
[1− ω(a)]s
(Final Stage)
ω(a)s
(Final Stage)
Figure 2.1: Timing of the model.
The timing of the game is simple; a three-stage, one-shot game is sufficient to derive
our main results. In the first stage, the government knows the income distribution
of all NGOs willing to enter the country and authorizes operations for n NGOs. In
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the second stage, all authorized NGOs simultaneously allocate their budget between
providing services (si) and investing in advocacy (vi). At the last stage, citizens decide
upon the effort they put into appropriating the projects (a). Finally, all players receive
their payoff. This mechanism is schemed in Figure 2.1.
The choice of the number of players (NGOs) by the government or the continuous
action space for NGOs makes the classic extensive-form representation of the game
impractical to display, nonetheless we can easily solve it by backward induction and
subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
2.2.2 Analysis
The model is solved by backward induction. At the last stage, n ≥ 1 NGOs active in the
country have invested Σibi monetary units, of which Σisi financed development projects,
and Σivi financed advocacy. Citizens choose the level of effort put into appropriating
aid projects by solving the following program:
Max
a
ω(a)Σisi − a
(Σivi)λ (2.4)
The first-order condition that optimizes this problem is ωa(a
∗)s = v−λ, in which
s = Σisi, and v = Σivi. The isoelastic properties of ω(a) allow that
ωa(a) =
κ
1 + ρ
[
1
1 + a
] ρ
1+ρ
=
κ1+ρ
1 + ρ
1
ωρ
.
We can rewrite the citizens FOC as an equilibrium condition at the 3rd stage
ω(a) = max
{
κ,
[
κ1+ρ
1 + ρ
svλ
] 1
ρ
}
, (2.5)
It is immediately obvious that ownership and appropriation efforts are increasing in
both service provision and advocacy, with respective elasticities 1/ρ and λ/ρ.
At the second stage, each individual NGO solves the following maximization prob-
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lem1:
Max
si,vi
ωsi
s.t bi = si + vi [Non-Distribution Constraint],
ω =
[
κ1+ρ
1 + ρ
svλ
] 1
ρ
[3rd stage equilibrium condition, (2.5)],
and (s∗j , v
∗
j ) ∈ argmax
sj ,vj
ωsj,∀j 6= i [Best response of n− 1 NGOs].
where a∗ and the case in which a∗ = 0 are made implicit to alleviate notation. Solving
the programme of the NGOs yields the following solution:
v∗ =
λ
1 + λ+ nρ
b (2.6)
and
s∗ =
1 + nρ
1 + λ+ nρ
b. (2.7)
in which b = Σibi are the aggregated budgets.
Proposition 2.1 (Aggregate investments in service provision and advocacy)
If n NGOs are allowed to operate in the country, then
1. if advocacy and appropriation efforts have high returns, then NGOs invest a larger
share of aid in advocacy;
2. if advocacy increases, then so do appropriation efforts;
3. if aid is fractioned, then NGOs free ride more on advocacy;
4. both advocacy and service provision monotonically increase with the number of
NGOs.
Proof The total derivative maximizing the objective function yields the following equi-
librium condition:
1Akin to a budget constraint, the term non-distribution constraint is usually employed when referring to
nonprofits since Hansmann (1980).
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dω
dsi
si + ω = 0⇒ Σni=1
[
dω
dsi
si + ω
]
= 0⇒ dω
ds
s+ ωn = 0
since ds/dsi = 1. The logarithmic derivative of the 3
rd stage equilibrium condition
(2.5) with respect to s yields
ρ
dω
ds
s
ω
= 1 +
dv
ds
s
v
(2.8)
By the non-distribution constraint, dv/ds = −1. Combing the two previous equa-
tions states the following second stage equilibrium condition:
v
s
=
λ
1 + nρ
(2.9)
Plugging this condition in the non-distribution constraint yields the desired solution.

A fragmented aid sector makes advocacy prone to free riding because its benefit,
improved governance, has the characteristics of a public good. Corrupt officials have
thus an incentive to sow discord among NGOs, inducing them to free ride more on
advocacy.
We can disaggregate the levels of advocacy and investment in projects at the indi-
vidual level to display the second-stage subgame Nash equilibrium:
s∗i =
1 + nρ
1 + λ+ nρ
b
and
v∗i = bi −
1 + nρ
1 + λ+ nρ
b
in which b = b/n. Richer NGOs are willing to contribute more to advocacy, i.e. to
the public good. As the average budget increases, so does the incentive to free ride on
other contributors.
This result is standard in the theory of public goods, although not necessarily realistic
in our context; in reality, politically motivated NGOs actively exert advocacy efforts,
no matter how small they are. On the contrary, large NGOs can be timid militants.
We address the question of political motivation in the next section.
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Before looking at the optimization problem of the government, it is useful to show
that free riding creates inefficiencies. Because we are concerned with the effectiveness
of aid, our well-being criterion is the payoff function of the citizens only. We defend this
choice with two arguments: (i) interests of NGOs should be aligned with those of their
beneficiaries, so that the well-being of NGOs should be perfectly correlated with the
well-being of citizens; and (ii) we care about ownership of aid. By adding the well-being
of corrupt officials, we would care about absolute levels of aid, disregarding the issue of
its distribution.
From the perspective of NGOs, the reaction function of the citizens, ω = s1/ρvλ/ρ,
displays an inverse U-shaped relationship between advocacy and appropriation efforts,
as shown in Figure 2.2. It reaches its maximum level when
vmax = argmax
v
(ω) =
λ
1 + λ
b. (2.10)
If the choices of NGOs result in corner solutions (all aid is invested in either projects
or advocacy), there are no changes in appropriation efforts and ownership remains at a
baseline ω(0). Intuitively, without advocacy efforts, there are no changes in appropria-
tion efficiency, and without projects, there is no reason to change baseline appropriation
efforts.
A low λ indicates that advocacy has little impact on the cost of appropriation efforts.
This can happen because the message of the NGO is too weak or because beneficiaries
are already highly organized and have little to gain from the NGO’s input. Conversely,
high returns of advocacy are most likely to occur when beneficiaries are disorganized
and uninformed.
To compute the first-best level of advocacy, plug the FOC of the citizens back in
to their payoff function. Evaluated at their optimized level, the utility of citizens is
UC = ωs ρ
1+ρ
.
Which yields the following optimal level of advocacy:
vop =
λ
1 + λ+ ρ
b. (2.11)
Proposition 2.2 (Free-ridding Inefficiency) If the amount of aid that a country
receives is fixed, then a single NGO should manage all of it.
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ω
Σivi
Σibi
ΣibiΣisi
vmaxv∗ vop
U˜NGOi
κ
Figure 2.2: Levels of advocacy at the equilibrium, optimum, and maximum appropriation.
Proof The total derivative of the citizens payoff relative to s is
dω
ds
s+ ω = 0 Plugging
in (2.8) yields
v
s
=
λ
1 + ρ
Combining this with the non-distribution constraint yields the desired solution. 
Figure 2.2 plots this optimum over the reaction function of the citizens. An indif-
ference curve shows the optimal decentralized choice of an NGO when the sector is
competitive.
The equilibrium choice of the NGO is the tangency point between its indifference
curve and the reaction function of citizens. As fragmentation increases among NGOs,
each will chose lower levels of advocacy, drifting away from the optimal monopolistic
situation. Advocacy levels that maximize appropriation efforts are not optimal either,
unless these efforts are efficient in achieving ownership (if ρ is low). Otherwise, when
intents of gaining ownership have no real effect due to the tight grip of the authorities,
encouraging appropriation is wasteful. Next, we close the model by solving the problem
of rent-seeking officials.
Turn now to the first stage. To alleviate notation, we drop the asterisk from equilib-
rium values v∗ and s∗. Likewise, and without loss of generality, we assume continuity of
the number of NGOs, imposing the restriction that, if allowed to operate, there should
be at least one (i.e. n ∈ [1,∞[ ). If the government could contract the advocacy con-
tent of aid, it would fix it to zero. However, this contract is unenforceable, because
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it is too demanding to monitor and to disentangle what part of aid is a service and
which is nurturing political leadership. From the point of view of the authorities, the
only observable variable is the presence or not of NGOs, given that they deliver the
authorizations to operate. The program of the government is

Max
n
(1− ω)s
s.t b¯n = v + s, [Aggregated Non-Distribution Constraints],
ω =
[
κ1+ρ
1 + ρ
svλ
] 1
ρ
[3rd stage equilibrium condition, (2.5)],
and
v
s
=
λ
1 + nρ
[2nd stage equilibrium condition, (2.9)].
Because s(n) is a bijective and monotonically increasing function of n, solving this
problem is akin to choosing the optimal s for the government. The first order condition
expressed in terms of the total derivative of the objective function with respect to s is
1− ω = dω
ds
s. (2.12)
This equilibrium condition states that the marginal benefit of allowing one additional
unit of service provision (the captured share 1−ω of that unit) must equal the marginal
cost of having the beneficiaries’ share improve. To obtain a more explicit expression
of the right-hand side of this equation, take logarithmic derivative of the third stage
equilibrium condition with respect to s:
dω
ds
s
ω
=
1
ρ
[
1 + λ
dv
ds
s
v
]
(2.13)
The second term inside the square brackets is proportional to the elasticity of advo-
cacy to services provision.
Lemma 2.1 The elasticity of advocacy to services provision is
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ε =
dv
ds
s
v
=
1
1 +
1
1
ρn
+ λ
1+λ+ρn
(2.14)
In which ε ∈ [0, 1] decreases in n and ρ and increases in λ, with limn→0 ε(n) = 1
and limn→∞ ε(n) = 0.
The appendix proves this statement. To each percentage increase of service provi-
sion, there is an increase in advocacy, which is marginally declining as the free riding
problem aggravates. Combining (2.12), (2.13) and (2.1) obtains the 1st stage equilib-
rium condition:
1− ω = 1 + λε
1 + ρ+ λε
(2.15)
Denote the left-hand side MB(n) for marginal benefit and the right-hand side
MC(n) for marginal cost. MB(n) and MC(n) are non-increasing, and as a result
of continuity and their limit conditions, are single-crossing if the following condition
holds:
ρ
1 + ρ+ λ
> κ (2.16)
This condition states that the government will allow NGOs only if it can withstand
appropriation efforts with ease, if the baseline ownership by beneficiaries is low, and
if advocacy has sufficiently low returns. Figure 2.3 plots both functions and the equi-
librium condition. Marginal costs are declining due to the free riding properties of
our problem: allowing more NGOs increases ownership, but in a marginally declining
manner.
Let MU(n) = MB(n) −MC(n) = 0 be the marginal payoff of n. Table 2.1 sum-
marizes the sign of the partial derivatives of functions MB(n) and MC(n) for any n.
The appendix details these computations. In line with proposition 1, the parameters
that increase the share of total aid devoted to service provision increase the marginal
benefits and reduce the marginal costs for the government.
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MB(n)
MC(n)
n
$
1+λ
1+ρ+λ
1
1+ρ
1 − κ
n∗
1 − ω∗
λ, b, κ
ρ
ρ
λ
Figure 2.3: Marginal Benefits and Costs of allowing one additional unit NGO
∂MB(n) ∂MC(n) ∂MU(n)
∂ρ + − +
∂λ − + −
∂b − 0 −
∂κ − 0 −
Table 2.1: Partial derivatives for MB(n) and MC(n) function.
Proposition 2.3 (Number of NGOs allowed by the Government) If condition
(2.16) holds, the authorities cannot observe each individual NGO’s income, and cannot
contract advocacy content, then they will deliver a unique number of permits n∗, which
maps a unique level of services s∗. The number of NGOs allowed will increase if
1. NGOs’ advocacy has low returns,
2. appropriation efforts have low returns,
3. agencies are poorer on average, and
4. baseline ownership is low.
Proof Notice that at the crossing point ∂MC(n∗)/∂n > ∂MB(n∗)/∂n. By implicit
derivation and using the partial derivatives stated above:
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dn∗
dλ
= − ∂MU(n
∗)/∂λ
∂MU(n∗)/∂n∗
< 0 ;
dn∗
dρ
= − ∂MU(n
∗)/∂ρ
∂MU(n∗)/∂n∗
> 0 ;
and
dn∗
db
= − ∂MU(n
∗)/∂b
∂MU(n∗)/∂n∗
< 0. 
The results provided in proposition 3 are quite intuitive. The government will be
more tolerant of the NGO sector if it does not consider it a threat. The model predicts
that areas under tight grip by corrupt authorities, or where NGOs have little influence,
will host more NGOs, which will have high incentives to free ride on each other.
Corollary 2.1 In a regime under which the government has a tight control on the
access of NGOs, beneficiaries are better off when the government does not feel its rents
threatened by the NGO sector.
Figure 2.3 shows that parameters increasing the share of aid devoted to services
shift the MB(s) curve upwards, and shift the MC(s) curve downwards. Because both
curves are positively sloped and single crossing, it is easy to see that parameters making
aid more service-intensive increase the equilibrium number of NGOs, and increase the
level of ownership by beneficiaries. Disturbingly, beneficiaries are better off with a
government untroubled by the actions of the NGO sector.
Corollary 2.2 If the government has more information on NGOs, it will deliver more
permits and extract larger rents. This slightly increases governance, and improves the
overall well-being of beneficiaries.
The model makes the simplistic assumption that the number of permits n is the only
strategy available to the government. Other observable characteristics of NGOs can al-
low the government to expand its strategy set: incomes, activities in other countries,
reputation, and so on, are signals correlated with political engagement. If the gov-
ernment knows the distribution of these correlated signals, it can set threshold values
such that it will not authorize any NGO above them. If the threshold monotonically
changes with n, then choosing it is equivalent to fixing a certain number of admissions.
For instance, we saw that richer NGOs are more likely to be politically active. Then,
the government will not admit any NGO richer than a threshold budget bˇ(n∗) in the
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income distribution. The comparative statics from λ and ρ on the threshold are thus
known. We have
dbˇ(n∗)
dλ
=
dbˇ(n∗)
dn∗
dn∗
dλ
< 0 and
dbˇ(n∗)
dρ
=
dbˇ(n∗)
dn∗
dn∗
dρ
< 0.
The government will allow richer NGOs in areas where they are less influential or
where appropriation efforts are less effective. Notice that, by fixing such thresholds,
allowed NGOs are poorer on average, which shifts the MB(n) curve upwards, increasing
the number of NGOs allowed, total service provision, and slightly improving ownership.
If the authorities can perfectly observe the income of NGOs, this improves the situation
of both beneficiaries and authorities.
2.3 Extensions of the Model
In the previous section, we assumed that NGOs take their decisions independently and
selfishly. In reality, NGOs often try to coordinate through non-binding contractual
arrangements, for example by signing the Istanbul Declaration (Istanbul Principles,
2011). By lacking any kind of enforcement, these documents usually remain vague
agreements on common values2. In this section, we explore how changes in the objective
functions of NGOs affect the wellbeing of target populations.
In order to do this, we apply our model to two different objective functions: first,
NGOs give different weights to recipient’s ownership relative to the size of their project;
second, NGOs form partnerships among each other. We show that these objective
functions do not improve the welfare of beneficiaries.
2.3.1 Focusing on Recipient’s Ownership
First, consider the case where some NGOs decide to focus more citizen’s ownership. In
this case, NGOs give more weight to overall beneficiaries’ appropriation relative to the
focus put on the success of their own project. Each individual NGO has the following
objective function:
2If these agreements where enforceable, then they should be studied through coalitional game theory. In
our model, unilateral deviation is always profitable: NGOs find it always individually beneficial to free ride on
other’s advocacy. Under these circumstances, coalitional rationality is violated (Maschler et al., 2013).
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ω
1
φi si
in which 1/φi measures NGO i’s focus on citizens’ ownership. If φi = 1, we are in
the benchmark model. The NGO, quite pragmatically, cares about how much of the
service provision it finances do beneficiaries actually own. When φi tends toward zero,
on the contrary, the NGO focuses mainly in improving ownership, at the cost of pulling
resources away from service provision. If, on the contrary, φi tends toward infinity,
then the NGO is unconcerned with appropriation: what matters to it is to report large
expenditures in service provision, whether end-line beneficiaries appropriate them or
not.
Using the same resolution method than in the previous section, we obtain:
v∗ =
λ
1 + λ+ ρnφ
b (2.17)
and
s∗ =
1 + ρnφ
1 + λ+ ρnφ
b (2.18)
where φ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
φi is the average weight put on ownership. At the individual level,
we have
si =
φi
φ
λ
1 + λ+ ρnφ
b
and
vi = bi − φi
φ
λ
1 + λ+ ρnφ
b.
Results are as expected. NGOs more focused on ownership dedicate more time to
advocacy. The description that we get of the NGO sector is now richer: the emphasis
put on ownership by all other NGOs determines the relative effort devoted to advocacy
for any single NGO. For example, if an NGO is pragmatic, in the sense that it cares
only about the efficiency of its own project (φi = 1) and if around it all other NGOs are
unconcerned with ownership, then it will have to exert more effort in advocacy despite
the fact that this action in not in its initial orientation.
Recall by proposition 2 that the free-ridding problem disappears when
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vOP =
λ
1 + λ+ ρ
b
In our framework, it is easy to find that NGOs can avoid the free riding problem if
φ
∗
=
1
n
. (2.19)
Once n NGOs are allowed, NGOs willing to make aid more efficient should optimally
increase the overall focus on ownership when the sector is more fractioned. Donors
might frown upon NGOs focusing ‘too much’ on ownership, taking it as naive idealism.
However, this naivete´ can improve interim efficiency (after admission of n NGOs) to a
certain extent because it allows counterbalancing free riding inefficiencies.
2.3.2 NGOs form partnerships
Assume now that NGOs decide to establish partnerships among each other. To make
this simple, suppose that the objective function of any NGO becomes
ω
(
si + γ
∑
j 6=i
sj
)
in which γ denotes the weight that NGOs give to the projects all other NGOs. If
γ = 1, an NGO gives as much importance to its own project as to the sum of all
other projects. By proceeding by the same method used in the previous section, at
equilibrium we obtain
⇔ v∗ = λ
1 + λ+ ρ n
1+γ(n−1)
b (2.20)
and
s∗ =
1 + ρ n
1+γ(n−1)
1 + λ+ ρ n
1+γ(n−1)
b. (2.21)
The greater the weight attached to the projects of others, the more an NGO invests
in advocacy. Free riding in advocacy is diminished by giving to service provision the
characteristics of a public good as well: NGOs start free riding on service provision
too. Because they are subject to a non-distribution constraint, the result is that the
proportion spent in each activity evens out. The optimal level of campaigning provided
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in (13) is reached when
γ∗ = 1 (2.22)
In words, if NGOs fully internalize the performance of all other NGOs, then the free
riding problem disappears.
Both principles, focusing more on ownership and forming partnerships among NGOs,
make the social optimum attainable at the second stage of the game. However, if the
authorities anticipate that the adoption of these principles threatens their rents, then
they will update their optimal level of delivered authorizations.
The appendix details how the MB(n) and MC(n) curves shift following changes of
φ and γ, summarized in table 2.2.
∂MB(n) ∂MC(n) ∂MU(n)
∂γ − + −
∂φ + − +
Table 2.2: Partial derivatives for MB(n) and MC(n) function.
Proposition 2.4 (Anticipation by the Government) If a rent-seeking authorities
anticipate that NGOs will adopt principles committing them to reduce free riding in
advocacy, then they will reduce the number of NGOs authorized to operate in the country.
Proof Identical to the proof of proposition 3, we obtain by implicit differentiation of
MU(n∗)
dn∗
dφ
= − ∂MU(n
∗)/∂φ
∂MU(n∗)/∂n∗
> 0; and
dn∗
dγ
= − ∂MU(n
∗)/∂γ
∂MU(n∗)/∂n∗
< 0. 
Figure 2.4 displays how the marginal benefit-marginal cost curves change following
attempts to reduce free riding inefficiencies3. Because both curves shift in opposite
directions, and are downward-sloping and single-crossing, trying to reduce free riding
(by either increasing γ or decreasing φ) shifts the equilibrium point to the north-west.
The effect is such that even if appropriation efforts become cheaper, the reward of
appropriation reduces; the net effect is that appropriation efforts become less valuable.
3Recall that s is a bijective increasing function of n.
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Figure 2.4: Attempts to reduce free-riding reduce the well-being of beneficiaries.
Corollary 2.3 If corrupt authorities regulate the access of NGOs and anticipate efforts
to reduce free riding inefficiencies, then the welfare of citizens diminishes when NGOs
attempt to reduce free riding. The second-best optimum is obtained when the NGO
sector is uncoordinated, and unconcerned with governance. This is
γ∗∗ = 0 and φ
∗∗
=∞
By (2.19) and (2.22), it is impossible to maximize the welfare of beneficiaries and to
wipe out free riding in advocacy simultaneously.
This negative result depends on the fact that the authorities perfectly anticipate
that NGOs will coordinate their efforts. Authorities optimize the number of permits
depending on the expected value of φ. In the next subsection, we explore how results
change when the authorities can perfectly observe the degree at which each NGO focuses
on ownership.
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2.3.3 Complete information
Suppose there exist two types of NGOs with parameters φh > φl among the N NGOs
willing to enter the country. Let nh + nl = N define the size of each group, and as
before denote φ the average lack of interest in ownership. By definition of an average
φh > φ > φl. If the authorities can perfectly observe the types, they first allow all
high-type NGOs and optimize n(φh); if the optimal n
∗(φh) ≤ nh, then only high type
NGOs are allowed. In this scenario, and by proposition 4, since allowed NGOs are less
politicized, more of them are allowed and beneficiaries’ ownership increases slightly.
If n∗(φh) ≤ nh does not hold, the authorities will deliver permits to all high-type
NGOs and allow a few low-type NGOs in. The MB(n) and MC(n) curves will display
a kink at nh with the property that
∂MB(n)
∂φh
≥ ∂MB(n)
∂φ
≥ ∂MB(n)
∂φl
∂MC(n)
∂φh
≤ ∂MC(n)
∂φ
≤ ∂MC(n)
∂φl
MB(n)
MC(n)
n
$
1 − κ
nii nh nci
Figure 2.5: Complete versus incomplete information on the types of NGOs
Figure 2.5 plots the MB(n)–MC(n) functions and the optimal number of permits
delivered under complete and incomplete information. Under complete information,
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initially marginal benefits are higher and and marginal costs are lower than in the
incomplete information case because only high types are allowed in. If there are rents
that can still be appropriated after all high types are allowed, authorities will allow
a few low types, which rapidly decrease marginal benefits and increase marginal cost
for the authorities. At limit conditions (if all N NGOs willing to enter are allowed or
if there are no NGOs) complete and incomplete information yield the same costs and
benefits.
Corollary 2.4 The number of NGOs allowed under complete information (nci) is larger
than the number of permits delivered under incomplete information (nii). Welfare of
the beneficiaries improves when authorities have complete information.
This result is in line with corollary 2. Denote φ the average depoliticization un-
der complete information. By choosing all high types, it follows that φnci ≥ φnii.
Comparing the advocacy to service provision ratio (v/s) in both regimes we obtain:
λ
1 + φnci
<
λ
1 + ρnφ
Asymmetries of information increase the advocacy content of aid, partially attenu-
ating the free riding inefficiency. However, because this makes the authorities shrink
the NGO sector too much, beneficiaries are overall better off when authorities have
complete information despite the fact that free riding issues are exacerbated.
2.4 Discussion
The recent surge in the number of development NGOs justify our assumptions on the
atomicity of the sector, substantiating our representation of NGOs as agents, and host
governments as principals. Competition among NGOs reduces their bargaining power
in front of host governments, akin to what occurs in markets. NGOs will deliver aid as
long as their participation constraint is satisfied: although, in the model, we normalize
the outside option to zero, in reality outside options are such that host governments
do not have to worry about attracting NGOs. Additionally, many NGOs perceive
providing inefficient aid as an improvement over not providing aid at all: NGOs will
enter the country if host countries give them the opportunity. By the late 1990’s,
donors saw in the provision of services by NGOs an insufficient mean of promoting
44 CHAPTER 2. ADVOCACY NGOS
development. Poverty-alleviating services were only treating the symptoms, not the
causes, of structural poverty; NGOs agreed that institutional change was required to
achieve effective long-run development (Mansuri and Rao, 2012). Institutional change
meant advocating for new rights for the poor, and curtailing privileges of the ruling elite.
This shift toward advocacy was easier said than done: it bore the risks of confronting the
local authorities, of frightening donors concerned with diplomatic affairs, and required
substantial coordination efforts among NGOs, in particular to agree upon a shared
vision of institutional change. Even when NGOs overcome these institutional barriers,
advocacy might not have the hoped influence on the local population. The message
might be too weak, or too unconvincing, or outright wrong in the eyes of beneficiaries.
For example, Boulding and Gibson (2009) finds that NGOs are conductive of political
change in small and poor municipalities in Bolivia, which are politically disorganized,
but not in larger, richer municipalities, in which trade unions and political parties out
noise NGOs. The sensitivity to the message is captured in the model by parameter λ.
Even if people are willing to listen, fear of repressive governments may deters civilians
from demanding new rights. Among several examples, one could quote the assassination
of 17 local workers of Action Contre la Faim (a French NGO) by the Sri Lankan military
in 2006 (The Independent, 2006). The repressive capacity of the state is captured by
parameter ρ.
Changing institutional arrangements injures the privileges of the established elite. In
the model, the conflict of interests arising between the elite and intended beneficiaries
over aid resources is very stylized. In it, the elite steal whatever beneficiaries do not
appropriate. This exaggeration impersonates more subtle phenomena of embezzlement:
nongovernmental aid reduces demands for accountability addressed to the state, redi-
recting public funds toward private interest; procedures in situ can impose that third
part-contracts, for instance in construction, are procured by fraudulent enterprises; or
corrupt officials might outright extort and blackmail NGO workers. A frequent prac-
tice is that local bureaucrats organize schemes to purchase alimentary aid at subsidized
prices to resale it at market prices (Centre Franc¸ais de Recherche sur le Renseignement,
2007). Another way in which authorities can extract rents from nongovernmental aid is
by allowing them to operate only where they will be less effective. A collective of NGOs
operating in Zambia denounced the adoption of a bill prohibiting NGOs from operating
in certain domains and geographical regions (Freedom House, 2014). The model predicts
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that governments will permit NGOs where they will be unable to promote institutional
change, in line with what NGOs operating in Zambia fear. Similar stringent laws were
adopted in Russia (The Economist, 2013), Venezuela (Human Rights Watch, 2013) and
Egypt (The Guardian, 2010), among others. NGOs understand that coordination ef-
forts can improve their prospects of achieving institutional change, by increasing their
bargaining power. The intent of NGOs is to integrate in the debate at the High Level
For a on aid effectiveness. In 2011, an Open Forum for Civil Society Organizations
adopted the Istanbul Principles (2011), which is a list of eight commitments addressed
at improving the efficiency of nongovernmental aid. In the model, we explore how the
adoption of such principles would affect the wellbeing of target populations. We apply
our model to two principles: first, NGOs are encouraged by the principles to ‘focus on
citizens’ ownership’ (parameter φ); second, NGOs are called to ‘pursue partnerships
with other NGOs’ (parameter γ). We show that the strict adherence to these principles
does not necessarily improve the welfare of beneficiaries, because full coordination will
reduce the incentives of host governments to deliver permits to NGOs. Donor states
have the political grit to ask from recipient countries adequate regulation of the NGO
sector. German Chancellor Angela Merkel appealed Russian president Vladimir Putin
to ‘give NGOs a chance’, following the crackdown of the sector in 2013; this appeal
remains unheard (Al Jazeera, 2013).
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a model of the political economy of nongovernmental orga-
nizations. We focus in the case in which NGOs deliver foreign aid in weakly institu-
tionalized countries. In a game-theoretical framework, players are a large number of
heterogeneous NGOs, the government of a developing country, and the people living
in this country. NGOs can take two actions: they provide poverty-alleviating services,
and they advocate the rights of the poor. Advocacy encourages beneficiaries to de-
mand better accountability to their government. Because the benefits of advocacy have
the characteristics of a public good, advocacy will be typically under-provided. NGOs
can remedy the problems of free riding by increasing efforts in coordination. However,
these efforts threaten the rents of corrupt officials, who will respond by cracking down
on the operations of NGOs. The costs of this crackdown can outweigh the benefits from
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investing in advocacy, turning a situation where no one free rides in advocacy into an
undesirable outcome.
We strongly stylize the behaviour of the government and the local population to
focus on the NGO sector. The assumption that all government officials are pure rent-
seekers, or that the local population is a monolithic decision-taking unit are certainly
unrealistic. However, by presenting a reduced-form optimization program for the local
population and for the government, we are able to elaborate further on the constraints
and strategies adopted by NGOs while maintaining analytical tractability.
Results of our model suggest that proponents of a bottom-up approach to develop-
ment should not go too far in dismissing the role of multilateral and bilateral donors
(Easterly, 2007; Banerjee and Duflo, 2011b). While merits of NGOs in the field can be
plentiful, they require an enabling environment allows their initiatives to thrive, while
their actions are legitimately and democratically monitored. Bilateral and multilat-
eral donors have the diplomatic and economic power capable of demanding that such
enabling environment is set in place.
2.6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1 Replace the value of n in (2.9) by its non-distribution constraint
value n = (s+ v)/b. This yields
λ
v
s
= 1 + ρ(s+ v)/b (2.23)
Implicit differentiation of v by s and multiplication by s/v obtains:
ε =
dv
ds
s
v
=
λv
s
− ρ
b
s
λv
s
+ ρ
b
v
Plugging back in (2.23) gives
ε =
1 + vρ/b
1 + vρ/b+ bρ/b
which easily reduces to the desired equation using (2.6). 
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Comparative statics of the MB(n) and MC(n) curves holding n constant.
We provide the comparative statics for the full model, i.e including parameters φ and
γ included in the extensions. This addition does not affect the comparative statics of
the basic model and diminishes redundant computations. In the second stage Nash
equilibrium we obtain:
s∗ =
1 + ρφ n
1+γ(n−1)
1 + λ+ ρφ n
1+γ(n−1)
bn and v∗ =
λ
1 + λ+ ρφ n
1+γ(n−1)
bn
2.6.1 Comparative statics for MB(n) = 1− ω
Taking the logarithm of the third stage equilibrium condition (2.5) we obtain
ln(ω) =
(1 + ρ)ln(κ) + ln(s) + λln(v)− ln(1 + ρ)
ρ
.
Partial derivatives yield
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
2.6.2 Comparative statics for MC(n) =
1 + λε
1 + ρ+ λε
Proceeding like in the proof of lemma 2.1, we obtain the elasticity for the general case
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ε =
1
1 +
1
1
ρφ n
1+γ(n−1)
+ λ
1+λ+ρφ n
1+γ(n−1)
The denominator in the second term of the denominator decreases in ρ and φ, and
increases in γ.  moves in the same direction. It is easy to verify that:
∇MC(ρ, λ, b, κ, γ, φ) =
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< 0
> 0
0
0
> 0
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
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Chapter 3
Encouraging Private Ownership of Public Goods: Theory and
Evidence from Belgium
Joint work with Gani Aldashev, Frano¸is Libois, and Astrid Similon.
Abstract
We study short-run and long-run effects of a government subsidy to private non-profit
ownership of public good projects. In a simple model, we show that the subsidy increases
the prices of project assets in the short run; however, the effect does not persist and
prices decline in the long run. This happens because the subsidy temporarily relaxes
the resource constraint of non-profit organizations, which allows them to engage in
supply-expanding activities. We test this prediction using a unique dataset that we
have constructed from Belgian notarial land-transaction records and exploiting a policy
reform in public subsidies for land purchases by non-profits aiming at creating privately-
owned natural reserves. Using the MS-estimation method (Maronna and Yohai, 2000)
robust to outliers, we also provide a methodological contribution to the analysis of
markets with quasi-donations.
Keywords: non-profit organizations; public goods; fundraising; land markets; pro-
tected areas; conservation.
JEL codes: L3, Q2, L22, H41, N5
3.1 Introduction
Non-profit organizations are key providers of public goods in modern economies. 67 per
cent of in-patient hospitals in the United States are non-profits, and so are all orchestra
and opera theatres in the United Kingdom and Japan (Bilodeau and Steinberg, 2006).
51
52 CHAPTER 3. ENCOURAGING PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PUBLIC GOODS
In the OECD countries, on average, 7.5 per cent of economically active population
is employed in the non-profit sector, and for some countries (Belgium, Netherlands,
Canada, U.K., Ireland) this share exceeds 10 per cent (Salamon, 2010). Non-profits
provide public goods in such diverse sectors as education, health, environment, social
protection, arts and culture, and human rights. The key issue is, therefore, whether
non-profit provision (and ownership of key assets used in provision) of public goods is
socially desirable. The seminal paper by Besley and Ghatak (2001b) provides the first
answer to this question: they argue that the ownership of such assets should be given
to the party (i.e. to the government or to the non-profit organization) that has the
highest valuation of the public good, regardless whose investment increases more the
value of the public-good project.
However, this general normative analysis does not provide guidance about how the
transfer of ownership of public goods to non-profits (in case these have the highest
valuation) should be organized. This is a fundamental policy question, given that gov-
ernments dispose of a rich set of tools that can affect the incentives for the non-profit
ownership of assets used for public good provision. These tools include, among others,
subsidies for purchase of assets from private holders, direct grants to non-profits, tax
exemptions to private sellers, etc. Designing an effective policy requires, first of all, un-
derstanding - theoretically and empirically - the effects of such policies on the behaviour
of non-profits and the outcomes on the asset markets. Economists’ current knowledge
in this area is extremely limited, in particular, at the level of a market. Insights from
standard microeconomic analysis of markets provide only limited answers, given that
nonprofits possibly react to financial incentives in ways which are systematically differ-
ent from those of their for-profit counterparts.
A crucial difference between for-profit and non-profit organizations is that nonprofits
are legally barred from redistributing profits. This “non-distribution constraint” first
formally introduced by Hansmann (1980), is at the heart of some of the main particu-
larities of the non-profit sector. Non-profits are predominant in the provision of goods
characterized by a high non-contractible quality content, such as health, the arts, or
biodiversity (Kuan, 2001; Thornton et al., 2008). Asymmetries of information make
most for-profits unreliable in the delivery of these goods characterized by unmeasurable
quality. Thus, users prefer to rely on organizations whose members are motivated by
something else than profit maximization. Non-profits have instead “missions”, which
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usually differ between organizations: each has a particular appraisal of the quality form
and content that should be embedded in the public good they provide. Given this
heterogeneity, missions can more or less accurately mirror the preferences of donors.
Nonprofits can improve the matching of their mission with the donor’s preferences by
either adapting their mission, or by persuading donors of the soundness of it (Rose-
Ackerman, 1982; Aldashev and Verdier, 2010).
In this paper, we evaluate the short-run and long-run effects of a government subsidy
to non-profit ownership of assets used in public-good projects. We first develop a
dynamic model of a market for assets populated by competing non-profits. The market
is decentralized and finding each new potential asset requires some search (prospecting)
efforts by the nonprofit. The nonprofit can persuade, at a cost, sellers into contributing
to the mission by either donating or accepting a lower payment for the asset they sell.
A good performance by a nonprofit at any given period attracts volunteer labour in
subsequent periods. This creates a virtuous circle because new volunteers engage in new
prospecting efforts, which expand supply. We show that the introduction of a subsidy
starts such a virtuous circle. Initially, the subsidy increases units exchanged and prices
paid. The increase in purchased quantities immediately after the shock attracts more
volunteer labour, which in turn prospects to increase supply. At the steady state, a
permanent subsidy permanently increases purchased quantities, while prices fall back
to their pre-subsidy levels.
Next, we test these predictions using a unique dataset that we have constructed from
notarial land-purchasing acts in the Walloon region of Belgium. This dataset includes all
the land purchases by environmental conservation non-profits in Walloon region between
1950 and 1994. Importantly, our data allows us to study the effect of the policy reform
undertaken in 1986, when the regional government introduced an ad valorem subsidy
to land purchase by non-profits. The non-contractible quality cannot – by definition –
be measured; however, other main predictions of the model are testable. We find that
exchanged quantities increase substantially, while the effect on the asset price varies over
time, in the way predicted by our model: the subsidy creates a sharp price increase
in the short-run, followed by a gradual decline of the land prices. We argue that this
occurs because the subsidy makes tradable goods (land) relatively cheaper than non-
tradable assets (time), inducing non-profits to reallocate their time/human resources
from quality-improving efforts into quantity-expanding activities, namely fundraising
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and prospecting activities. Because the reallocation of internal resources takes some
time, the subsidy initially creates a demand shock by increasing the purchasing power
of the nonprofits, and over time prices gradually decrease due to the reallocation of
non-tradable resources into searching and negotiating activities. This non-linear trend
in prices is empirically identified thanks to the fact that the introduction of the subsidy
was unexpected by market participants, and because comparable land unaffected by
the reform did not exhibit any similar pattern regarding their prices. In addition, while
we cannot directly observe quality, the data shows that nonprofits for which quantity-
based objectives are emphasized in their mission statements capture a significantly
more important share of the market, compared to nonprofits emphasizing quality-based
objectives in their mission statements.
Our paper also makes a methodological contribution to the empirical analysis of
markets for assets with a public-good component. A broad range of markets in which
non-profits represent the buyer side fall into this category: the markets for works of art,
labour markets for jobs in the non-profit sector, etc. In such markets, the motivation
of actors on the supply side often consists of a mix of profit-oriented and altruistic
elements, and thus such actors are often willing to sell the assets at a reduced or sym-
bolic price or donate them. Data from such markets thus usually contain numerous
observations that are considered as outliers. We show that by the use of an appropri-
ate estimator robust to outliers (the MS-estimator, developed by Maronna and Yohai,
2000), one can estimate the trends in market outcomes much more accurately.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical
model of a market for assets and derives testable predictions. Section 3 describes the
context from which our data is collected, provides a short history of natural reserves
in the Walloon region and describes the dataset. Section 4 presents our identification
strategy, the descriptive statistics and the results of the regression analysis. Section 5
discusses the interpretation of our empirical results and the methodological contribu-
tion. Section 6 highlights the broader implications of our findings and concludes.
3.2 Model
During each period t, there is a unit size continuum of size k potential sellers, each
endowed with one unit of an asset required for the production of a public good. A
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set of i ∈ N non-profit Organizations (NPOs) are potentially interested in purchasing
such assets. The market is decentralized, and NPOs have to exert a time-consuming
effort nit to find, bargain and match with potential sellers. For simplicity, suppose that
that k is sufficiently large, or prospecting sufficiently inefficient, for the probability
of a seller being discovered by more than one NPO is negligible. Define nit as the
prospecting effort exerted by each NPO, expressed in units of time. This effort has
two effects: first, it allows the NPO to discover nit potential sellers, and secondly, it
persuades discovered sellers to accept a lower price for their asset. This second effect
arises through bargaining and persuasion. Conditional on being discovered, a seller
trades if the price pikt proposed by the NPO is above her reservation price γ
k.
Suppose that γk follows a uniform distribution defined as follows:
γk v U
[
0,
1
nit
.
]
While NPOs do not know the exact willingness to pay of the sellers, prospection
efforts narrow their distribution. Conditionally on discovering a seller, trade occurs
with probability nitp
ik
t . Given that the NPO discovers n
i
t potential sellers, the supply
that i faces is
qit =
∫
k
nit
2
pikt dk = n
i
t
2
pit
in which qit are the units of asset supplied at t, and p
i
t denotes the average price paid
by NPO i. Note that the square exponent of prospection efforts captures the double
dividend of discovering sellers, and reducing expected reservation prices. The inverse
supply function writes
pit =
qit
nit
2 . (3.1)
The mission of each non-profit is the provision of a public good which has a quantity
and a quality dimension. The public good uses qti assets as an input. Let us denote
the quantity and the quality of the public good provided by non-profit i, respectively,
with qi and xi. Each non-profit manager has v
i
t units of volunteer labour time that she
allocates between improving the quality of the public good (xit), conducting fundraising
activities (f it ), and searching/prospecting for the assets necessary to the production
56 CHAPTER 3. ENCOURAGING PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PUBLIC GOODS
of the public good (nit). Given the legal non-profit status, the organizations cannot
distribute earnings amongst its members. The optimization problem of non-profit i at
period t is:
max
{qit,xit,nit,f it}
qitx
i
t
ωi
[Objective function]
s.t vit ≥ xit + f it + nit, [Time constraint]
(1− σ)pitqit ≤ µf it , [Non-distribution constraint]
with pit = q
i
t/n
i
t
2
. Each NPO pursues the double objective of increasing the quan-
tity and quality of the public good it produces, weighted by ωi in the Cobb-Douglas
objective function. ωi increases with the intrinsic preference for the quality dimension.
Notice that we implicitly assume that time devoted to improve quality during period t
applies only to assets purchased during this period; stocks of assets purchased in previ-
ous periods have already benefited from quality improvements and remain unchanged
in subsequent periods. A simple way of justifying this assumption is by stating that
available volunteer hours vit are net of time resources sunk in the management of pre-
viously purchased lands. The Cobb-Douglas objective function prevents that changes
in the price of assets directly modify the allocation of volunteer time: this choice is
made to prevent our results from being explained by simple substitution effects. The
first inequality in the optimization programme displays the time resource constraint of
the organization in terms of volunteer hours available at period t. The non-distribution
constraint states that all the funds available to the non-profit have to equal its expen-
ditures for public good provision (i.e. the organization cannot distribute profits to its
owners/members). The only expenditure item is assets purchased. Government pro-
vides the ad valorem subsidy σ ∈ [0, 1] for asset purchase over the paid price pit. On
the revenue side, the available funds are obtained through donations (collected thanks
to fundraising activities with the simple linear technology µf it ).
3.2.1 Static Equilibrium
The Lagrangian associated to the problem of the NPO is :
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L(qit, xit, nit, f it , λit, νit) = qitxitω
i − λit
[
(1− σ)
(
qit
nit
)2
− µf it
]
+ νit(v
i
t − xit − f it − nit)
in which λit and ν
i
t are the Lagrange multipliers. Solving this problem characterizes
the static equilibrium (details are provided in the appendix). In terms of the allocation
of available volunteer time we obtain
xit
∗
=
2ωi
3 + 2ωi
vit [Time devoted to improving quality]
nit
∗
=
2
3 + 2ωi
vit [Time devoted to prospecting for assets]
f it
∗
=
1
3 + 2ωi
vit [Time devoted to fundraising]
The specification of the objective function makes the allocation of time invariant in
changes of the relative price of the assets. As one could expect, when the NPO weights
more quality relative to quantity (when ωi increases), time devoted to improve quality
increases, to the detriment of prospecting and fundraising activities. More available
volunteer hours increase the time devoted to all three activities by a fixed proportion.
Concerning quantities purchased, the optimization program obtains:
qit
∗
= 2
(
vit
3 + 2ωi
)3/2(
µ
1− σ
)1/2
(3.2)
Improvements in the fundraising technology (µ), and increases in the subsidy (σ)
relax the non-distribution constraint of the NPO, allowing it to purchase more assets.
More volunteer hours allow the NPO to devote more time to prospecting activities,
finding more potential sellers and persuading them of selling more assets. As noted
above, an increased focus on the quality dimension reduces time devoted to prospecting,
driving down quantities purchased.
Finally, the equilibrium price paid by i is:
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pit
∗
=
√
3 + 2ωi
vit
· µ
1− σ (3.3)
As fundraising technology improves, prices increase because the NPO has more dis-
posable income, shifting the demand curve upwards. An increased focus on quality
increases prices as well, because less time is devoted to prospecting, which results in
worse deals for the NPO. On the contrary, more available volunteer time increases
prospecting. Finally, an increase in the subsidy shifts the demand curve up, increas-
ing prices, as in any typical market. Next, we explore how this equilibrium changes
dynamically.
3.2.2 Dynamics
Assume that the number of volunteers willing to adhere to a certain NPO depends on
its performance in the previous period. Namely, volunteers adhere to the organization
if it has performed well in the quantity and in the quality dimension. Because quality is
by assumption non-observable, volunteers infer the quality improvements by observing
how much time has been devoted to (observable) fund raising and prospection. The
more time the NPO devotes to these activities, the less volunteers are willing to adhere,
as they feel that it does not invest sufficient resources in the desirable output. In other
words, the NPO appears to less driven by the mission, and more by a budget-maximizing
strategy. Assume that
vit+1 =
qit
f it + n
i
t
. (3.4)
Substituting by the static equilibria values of qit ,f
i
t , and n
i
t at any period t, this
rewrites as a law of motion of volunteer time:
vit+1 =
2
3
[
µ
1− σ
vit
3 + 2ωi
] 1
2
.
This particular law of motion is a calibration adapted to emulate the results obtained
in the empirical section of this paper. It ensures a closed-form solution and a convergent
time series; other laws of motion, if convergent, would produce qualitatively similar
results to those obtained here. The 1/2 exponent on vit guarantees that this series is
convergent.
3.2. MODEL 59
From any initial arbitrary volunteer time vi0, the law of motion obtains
vit =
[
2
3
[
1
3 + 2ωi
· µ
1− σ
] 1
2
]2−21−t
vi0
2−t
(3.5)
which is the value of vit at any period t depending in the initial stock of volunteer
time. The Appendix proves this statement. Note that there is some path dependence, as
the initial stock of volunteer hours determines the subsequent trajectory. As t increases,
volunteer time converges to its steady state value
viSS =
4
9
[
1
3 + 2ωi
· µ
1− σ
]
. (3.6)
Remark that the steady state is independent from the initial volunteer labour time.
Relaxing the non-distribution constraint increases quantities purchased, attracting more
volunteers in the long run. Finally, quality-oriented NPOs will attract less volunteers in
the long run. The quadratic supply function indicates that the returns of prospecting are
surpass those of investing in quality; each unit of labour devoted to prospecting increases
purchases more than it would have improved quality, therefore quantity-oriented NPOs
will attract relatively more volunteers.
Plugging viSS in equations (3.2) and (3.3) one obtains the steady state quantities and
prices:
qiSS =
16
27
(
1
3 + 2ωi
)3(
µ
1− σ
)2
piSS =
3
2
(3 + 2ωi)
Proposition 3.1 (Steady state prices and quantities) Under the law of motion
of volunteer labour defined in (3.4), the steady state for each NPO in this decentral-
ized market is such that:
1. if fundraising technology improves or if the government introduces subsidies, then
the amount of assets purchased increases at the steady state;
2. if the NPO weights more quality than quantity, then at the steady state prices paid
are higher and quantities purchased are smaller;
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3. the subsidy has no effect on the steady state price.
It is immediate that:
d2qiSS
dσdωi
< 0
Corollary 3.1 (Effect of the subsidy across NPOs) NPOs more concerned with
the quality dimension will buy proportionately less assets when the subsidy is introduced.
It follows that the subsidy will decrease the market share of those more concerned with
the quality dimension.
Let us study now the effect of the introduction of the subsidy in the short run by
examining the transition from the pre-subsidy steady state to the steady state in which
the government finances the permanent subsidy. Denote t = 0 the period at which the
subsidy is introduced. The moment at which the unexpected subsidy is introduced, the
number of volunteers remains at the pre-subsidy steady state until new recruitments
occur. By (3.6),
vi,eaSS =
4
9
[
µ
3 + 2ωi
]
in which vi,eaSS denotes the ex-ante steady state. The moment the subsidy is intro-
duced, using (3.3) and (3.2) we how that prices and quantities jump to:
pit=0 =
1√
1− σ
3
2
(3 + 2ωi)
qit=0 =
1√
1− σ
16
27
(
1
3 + 2ωi
)3
µ2
Immediately after the introduction of the subsidy, prices and quantities are multi-
plied by scalar (
√
1− σ)−1 larger than one. By substituting the ex-ante steady state
volunteer time as an initial condition in (3.5), the number of volunteers at each t after
the shock is
vit =
(
1
1− σ
)1−2−t
4
9
[
µ
3 + 2ωi
.
]
(3.7)
From it, we obtain the motion of quantities and prices following the introduction of the
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subsidy:
qit
∗
=
16
27
(
1
3 + 2ωi
)3
µ2
(
1
1− σ
)2−3·2−t−1
pit
∗
=
3
2
(3 + 2ωi)
(
1
1− σ
)2−t−1
Proposition 3.2 (Motion of prices and quantities) Under the law of motion of
volunteer labour defined in (3.4), the introduction of an unexpected permanent subsidy
is such that:
1. immediately after the introduction of the subsidy, there is a hike of demand, which
increases prices,
2. the price of the assets progressively declines while purchases progressively increase
3. at the new steady state, the price converges to the pre-subsidy situation, while the
increase in purchases is permanent.
We test this proposition in the empirical section of the paper. Figure 3.1 plots
quantities and prices for four NPOs, which vary in their degree of concern for the
quality of the public good. We fix µ = 1 and σ = 0.5 which corresponds to a 50%
ad-valorem subsidy. Initial available voluntary hours are arbitrarily fixed. Before the
permanent subsidy unexpectedly introduced at t = 0, prices and quantities converge to
the ex-ante steady state. At the moment of the shock, both prices and quantities hike,
then prices progressively return to their pre-subsidy levels, while quantities continue
rising until reaching a new, higher, steady state.
3.3 Institutional context and data
3.3.1 Natural reserves worldwide and in the Walloon Region
The first American national park, the Yellowstone, was established by the U.S. Congress
already in 1872. In Europe, the formal institutions for the conservation of nature started
somewhat later and were much more grassroot-driven. The United Kingdom and France
saw the birth of private conservation charities in 1895 and 1901, respectively. These so-
cieties had the mission of protecting countryside landscapes, scenic beauty, and major
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Figure 3.1: Motion of Prices and Quantities after the introduction of the Subsidy.
natural sites (Lansley, 1996; Lepart and Marty, 2006). In the UK, the National Trust
almost immediately started to buy land plots and buildings from private owners. It
created several natural reserves and progressively became the main private actor of en-
vironmental policy in the UK. Thanks to its two million members, the National Trust
has relieved the UK government from a substantial part of its tasks in the environ-
mental conservation domain; in exchange, the government granted the charity with
considerable fiscal advantages. In France, the “Socie´te´ pour la Protection des Paysages
et de l’E´sthe´tique de la France”, the oldest French environmental non-profit association
chose instead a strategy focused on lobbying the government on various environmental
policies. France passed its first environmental-protection laws in the beginning of the
19th century, while its first national park was established in 1913.
Currently, throughout the world, private foundations aimed at creation and pro-
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tection of natural reserves play an important role both in public-good provision and
advocacy. The prominent example is The Nature Conservancy, a U.S.-based global-
operations environmental charity. With more than one million members, Nature Con-
servancy manages over 8000 kilometers of rivers and 50 million hectares of land (a
surface exceeding that of California) in more than thirty countries (www.nature.org).
Belgium (and especially the Walloon Region, the Southern half of the country) ex-
hibits a system of environmental conservation that combines certain aspects of the
French mostly public sector-oriented approach with some characteristics of the British
charity-based approach. In 1943, Ardenne et Gaume, an environmental non-profit, cre-
ated the first natural park in the Walloon Region. In subsequent thirty years, the
environmental non-profits kept playing the major role of environmental public good
providers, by either contracting long-term leases or purchasing and managing new plots
of land. Initially, the budgets of non-profit consisted mainly of private contributions
and donations, complemented by small-scale commercial activities.
The national government showed interest in the natural park creation and manage-
ment around 1957 and made its first acquisition of land in 1972. Political decentraliza-
tion of Belgium implied that the conservation of nature fell under regional jurisdiction
in 1980, and the government of the Walloon Region created a new strategy, which in-
cluded a set of policies towards environmental non-profits. Most importantly, in 1986
the regional government passed a reform (with retroactive effect to January 1, 1985)
introducing large subsidies to environmental non-profits. This reform essentially con-
sisted of two sets of subsidies. The first (and by far the most important) is a subsidy
for land acquisition, consisting of paying (reimbursing) 50 per cent of the price of land
plots that a legally registered non-profit purchased from a private owner (with the scope
of creating a natural reserve) on any date after Jan. 1, 1985. The second is a subsidy
for management expenses of natural reserves, which consists of covering 50 per cent of
effective ordinary management expenses (or an annual lump-sum of around 100 Euros
per hectar of certified natural-reserve surface) and of fully covering the extraordinary
(emergency) expenses. To qualify for these subsidies, the land plot acquired by a non-
profit should obtain the status of “Re´serve Naturelle Agre´e” (RNA hereafter) from the
Department of Nature and Forests of the Walloon regional government, following the
decision of a council of experts. This council (composed of scientists, non-profit repre-
sentatives, and public servants) is the only administrative structure that has the right
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to decide on the RNA status. Its main task that of verifying whether the proposed
land area has a sufficiently high environmental value. This council also plays a simi-
lar role in the creation of the public counterpart of RNAs, called “Re´serves Naturelles
Domaniales” (RNDs), that are publicly owned and managed.
Given the substantial expertise of the council members, virtually all the existing
natural reserves are created on the land areas with a relatively high environmental
potential. Such land typically has few alternative production uses (such as intensive
agriculture) but, if properly managed, can yield considerable positive externalities (pro-
tection of natural habitats and endangered species, environmental tourism, etc.). Thus,
the main actors in the Walloon region on the buyer side of the market for this type
of land are the legally recognized environmental non-profits (there are ten such orga-
nizations in the region) and, to some extent, the regional government. The seller side
consists of a multitude of small landowners (many of whom are heirs of individuals that
bought these land plots in the past mostly for extensive pastoralism or to diversify their
wealth portfolios).
3.3.2 Data
The data that we collected comes from the archives of the branch of the Walloon re-
gional administration that is in charge of the conservation of nature1. This branch
is in charge of administering payments of subsidies to environmental non-profits both
for land acquisition and for the management of the natural reserves. We construct
our data using the certified copies of notary deeds of land acquisitions by non-profits
from private owners, that the legally registered environmental non-profits have to pro-
vided to the DGO3 in case they receive any subsidy. Importantly, even though the
policy was introduced in 1986, subsidies for ordinary management expenses are paid
for natural reserves regardless of their date of creation. Provided that the land plot has
a sufficiently high environmental value, conditions to fulfil in order to qualify for the
ordinary-management subsidy are quite loose. This implies that for the year range 1943
to 2010, we have data on virtually all the land transactions related to creation of private
natural reserves. In this paper, we restrict our analysis to the period between January
1950 and March 1994 for two main reasons: (1) there is no price deflator available for
the observations before 1950, and (2) starting April 1994, the European Union started
1Direction Ge´ne´rale Ope´rationelle 3 (DGO3)
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to provide additional subsidies for environmental non-profit land purchases through the
program (with somewhat different eligibility conditions), which we plan to investigate
in future work.
From each notary deed, we extracted (and quantified, wherever needed) information
about the transaction, i.e. the date and the price at which land was purchased, identities
of both parties, and precise information about land plots (geographic characteristics,
cadastral number, size of the plot, and the exact location). Importantly, given that our
sources are the notary deeds, we can disregard the problems related to misreporting,
which usually have to be addressed in survey-based data.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Identification strategy
Our identification strategy relies on the discrete change in policy towards non-profits
introduced in 1986 by the Walloon regional government, as described above. This policy
change deeply modified the incentives faced by non-profits. We want to analyze the
behavioral response of non-profits to this policy change, both in the short- and the long
run, as compared to the behavior and outcomes before the policy reform.
We argue that this identification strategy is valid because the policy reform was
unanticipated and not simultaneous with any other major change in environmental
policies. The reform was carried out by a coalition government consisting of Christian-
Democrats and Liberals, shortly after this government was formed. Given that the
Walloon region is traditionally a stronghold of the Socialist Party, this particular gov-
ernment is (so far) the only regional government in the history of the Walloon region
where Socialists were not in power, and for the first time, the minister of environment
was a Liberal and not a Socialist. Given the Belgian political context, prior to the
elections that led to formation of this government, it was thus extremely difficult to
foresee the exact composition of this government and the identity of ministers’ cabinet
members. Moreover, the reform was not widely discussed, neither at the regional parlia-
ment, nor in the media, essentially because in that particular period, tensions between
the French-speaking and the Flemish-speaking communities in Belgium occupied most
of the public debates, and the environmental conservation was definitely not considered
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a key issue2.
The timing of elections and of the implementation of reform also limited potential
anticipation effects. The regional government was in place from December 1985 on-
wards, following the regional election in October 1985. The reform was then passed,
in a relatively short period of time. Transactions on the land market, instead, require
substantial amount of time to be concluded3. Thus, this timing leaves little space for
the reform to have retroactive effects on transaction prices before July 1986. For robust-
ness, we provide additional evidence below that our findings are not driven by purchases
between 1985 and July 1986. If anything, our estimates provide a lower bound, if some
of the land transactions finalized after July 1986 had not yet been influenced by the
reform.
Our identification relies on the policy break and on comparing the land plots with
similar characteristics transacted before and after the reform. However, one key concern
is that other (unobservable) changes in the environment of the market for land might
have occurred around the same time. This would jeopardize our identification. To allay
this concern, we collected the data on the aggregate market prices for comparable types
of land (woodland and farm land/pastures). We use these series to show that there are
no similar changes in the prices for these types of land (that do not qualify for the
subsidy), in the several years before and after the policy reform.
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics
The dataset that we use for this paper consists of 938 land plots acquired by environ-
mental non-profits between 1950 and 1994. This represents virtually the universe of
such land purchases within this time period4. Transactions at the beginning of this
period are few, given that systematic land purchase by non-profits started in the 1970s,
followed by a boom in both the quantity and the size of transactions in the 1990s, as
can be seen in Figure 3.2. 148 plots were purchased before the reform and 790 were
bought after it. Twenty-one plots were purchased between January 1, 1985 (the date
of retroactive effect of the reform) and the official announcement of the reform.
The land surface purchased increased substantially: it rose from 134 hectares before
2Reading through the major regional newspapers in the period 1985-87, we could not find any article
discussing this reform.
3Typically, once the buyer and the seller agree on the transaction details, they sign a provisional sale
agreement in front of a notary; a procedural delay of two to four months usually follows, before the final bill
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Figure 3.2: Number of land transactions with non-profits as buyers
the reform to 728 hectares after it. The number of environmental non-profits buying
land increased as well: three non-profits were buying land before 1986, whereas after
the reform this number doubled. However, the market structure became much more
concentrated. Before the reform, two non-profits had relatively large market shares
(71 and 27 per cent, respectively), leaving a residual market share to the third actor.
After the introduction of subsidies, the largest buyer increased its market share even
further (up to 93 per cent of the market), becoming a de facto monopolist (as depicted
in Figure 3.3).
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of our main variables before and after the
reform of July 1986. In addition, we also look at a sub-sample of observations which
are potentially strongly affected by the reform and are less affected by potential un-
observable variables. This restriction allows us to exclude the surge in the number of
plots purchased in the early 1990s, where other time-varying factors might be driving
this dynamics. In this sub-sample, we thus focus on 75 observations after the reform
and compare them to 75 observations just before it (we also compare the post-reform
observations to 75 acquisitions before January, 1 1985, the earliest purchase date to
of sale is signed in the notary’s office.
4We lose 11 observations because of missing information on the transaction price.
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Figure 3.3: Land market share, by non-profit, before and after the reform
qualify for the subsidy).
In all comparisons, prices after the reform are higher than those before the reform.
The difference is statistically significant only when we restrict the comparison to obser-
vations shortly before and shortly after the reform; however, notice that the variance in
prices also increases considerably. Average plot size remains relatively stable (slightly
below one hectare). Around half of the plots were owned by multiple sellers (these typ-
ically are multiple heirs of the landowning farmer). This share falls to less than 40 per
cent after the reform. In addition, there are two large changes in the portfolio of plots
purchased by the non-profits. First, there is a change in land occupation pattern of
purchased plots. After the reform, non-profits seem to buy more woodlands, wetlands
and pasture lands, and fewer wastelands. However, the change in the quality of land
is small when we restrict our comparison to the 150-observation window (dropping the
observations in the “grey” area between early 1985 and July 1986). The differences
in land quality are not statistically significant in this restricted window (because point
estimates are smaller and not because difference-in-means tests are less accurate in
smaller sample). Finally, as shown in Figure 3.4, non-profits increase the geographic
spread of their purchasing activity after the reform. They remain highly active at their
core area in the Eastern part of the Walloon region, but start to buy plots in other
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provinces where land prices are, on average, higher. This might indicate that after the
reform non-profits increase their search and prospecting efforts.
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Figure 3.4: Location of acquisitions in the Walloon region before and after the reform
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Figure 3.5: Interpretation of regression coefficients
3.4.3 Regression analysis
As explained above, our econometric analysis relies on the discontinuity around the
policy reform date. We thus estimate the relationship:
Lnpricei = α0 + α1Policyi + α2Y eari + α3Policyi ∗ Y eari + Xiβ + εi. (3.8)
Here, Lnpricei is log of the (deflated) purchase price of plot i, Policyi is an indicator
variable that takes value 1 if the plot was purchased under the subsidy regime, and
zero otherwise, Y eari denotes the year of transaction, Xi is a vector of control variables
(size of the plot, number of sellers, geographic characteristics, identity of the buyer,
etc.), and ε an idiosyncratic component. Figure 3.5 presents the interpretation of the
main coefficients. α1 denotes the average short-term change in prices of land plots
driven by the policy change (i.e. with the year of the policy change is referenced as
Y ear = 0). Since our dependent variable is expressed in logs and Policyi is a binary
variable, the exact predicted average change between the prices of subsidized and non-
subsidized land purchases equals eα1−1. α2 controls for the overall time trend in prices,
whereas α3 allows to capture the difference in time trends between the period before
the reform and the one after the reform. In a linear specification, the time necessary
to revert to the pre-reform trend after the policy reform is given by the ratio between
α1 and α3, provided that these two coefficients have opposite signs. Table 3.2 reports
the results of estimating of equation (3.8) by ordinary least squares. Point estimates of
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α1 are systematically positive, relatively large but very imprecise (standard errors are
clustered at municipality level); therefore, the coefficient is never significantly different
from zero in any of our specifications. However, it is worth noting that estimates of
both α1 and α3 are relatively stable when we add controls for the number of sellers, land
quality (geographic characteristics), and whether the plot is located in a province where
there were no purchases before 1986. Specification (5) adds controls for the identity of
the buyer (i.e. non-profit fixed effects). Taking into account that only two non-profits
engaged in land purchase transactions both before and after 1986, these controls purge
our estimated coefficients from a potentially different market behaviour of new buyers.
The estimated coefficient α1 increases substantially, which suggests that new entrants
buy, on average, at lower prices than the two incumbents. Observing the two main
coefficients of interest jointly, we find some evidence in favour of an increase in prices
after the introduction of subsidies; however, this increase looks temporary as suggested
by a negative sign of α3 (the coefficient of the interaction term between the time trend
and the policy dummy).
The methodology used for these estimations is unsatisfactory, as clearly indicated
by the coefficients of the plot area. In general, land market prices are almost perfectly
proportional to the plot size; our discussions with several notaries involved in such
transactions indicate that in most transactions, the purchase price is roughly calculated
as the price per-hectare multiplied by the plot surface (after taking into account the land
quality). Therefore, we should observe that a one percent increase of plot area should
be accompanied by an increase in price by roughly one percent. Our OLS estimations
suggest, instead, that the price only increases by 0.8% or less (moreover, the coefficient
is somewhat unstable across specifications).
A potential explanation for this under-estimation is the public-good nature of assets
that are traded on this market. The land market for natural reserves is a market where
assets acquired by non-profits are used to produce public goods. Like in any other
land market, buyers exchange money for land plots, and, overall, prices are determined
by demand and supply. However, unlike in the usual land markets, buyers also invest
substantial effort in convincing sellers to accept a lower price in the interest of the public
good (or in prospecting for sellers that are more public-spirited). During our work on
data, we collected anecdotal evidence concerning several landowners who were happy to
sell their land for a symbolic price, provided that the buyer maintains the landscape and
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protects endangered animals living in the area. These benefits are non-rival and non-
excludable, which means that the seller is sure to enjoy those environmental services
without paying a management cost. On the other hand, non-profits are sometimes
inclined to pay a relatively high price for a small plot because that plot would allow the
extension of a green mesh between sites. Both types of transactions constitute outliers,
and failing to take them into account biases the estimates obtained above.
More precisely, from the econometrics point of view, these transactions constitute
vertical outliers for small plots with high prices and bad leverage points for large plots
sold at symbolic prices. The presence of both types of outliers biases regression co-
efficients downwards and increases standard errors. In specification (6) of Table 3.2,
we estimate our model including a dummy variable flagging seven most obvious quasi-
donations, i.e. land plots sold for a clearly symbolic price. Four of these transactions
occurred before July 1986 and the remaining occurred after. The price-surface elastic-
ity is jumps from 0.75 to 0.82 and the t-statistic doubles. The coefficient on the policy
dummy drops by about 15 per cent, whereas the R2 reaches 0.72. This implies that
correcting for less than one percent of observations has a major influence on our re-
sults. Proceeding in such a way would not be problematic if we could easily flag all the
transactions with exceptionally low and high prices; however, this is quite cumbersome
(given the size of our dataset) and might also involve some arbitrariness in borderline
cases.
A better way of attacking this problem is to use an estimator robust to outliers.
We opt for the MS-estimator proposed by Maronna and Yohai (2000) and developed
by Verardi and Croux (2009). It allows for a robust and efficient estimation in the
presence of outliers in a multidimensional setting, deals with dummy variables in the
set of explanatory variables, and properly handles asymmetric distribution of residuals
in the presence of outliers. The loss function of this estimator is a Tukey-Biweight
function where the marginal change of the residuals’ weight tends to 0 as residuals
become large. It means that all observations have some weight in the regression but
that this weight does not explode when the observation lies far away from the regression
line (or, more precisely, far away from the core group of observations in a multivariate
sense).
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Table 3.3 reports estimates of the same specifications than those in Table 3.2, with
estimations performed using the MS-method. Robust estimation does not affect the
signs of coefficients. The elasticity of prices to land surface is now very close to one and
is highly stable across specifications. The introduction of the subsidy has an estimated
positive effect on prices of an order between 41 and 57 per cent. Therefore, for a plot
valued e100, the introduction of the subsidy pushes the price up to e150 (of which e75
are paid by the non-profit recipient of the subsidy). Thus, in the short run the subsidy
represents a e25 saving for the non-profit. Over time, the price steadily declines until
it reaches the pre-subsidy price around nine years after the introduction of the subsidy.
Given that our sample is limited to the eight years following the reform, we cannot
know if the trend would have continued until subsidized prices become actually lower
than non-subsidized prices or whether it would have stabilized around the trend.
The introduction of the dummy variable indicating quasi-donations in the last spec-
ification leaves our estimates virtually unchanged, contrarily to the instability of OLS
estimates noted above. The regression coefficient on this dummy is unsurprisingly large,
predicting a drop in the price for these plots by more than 99 per cent; however, all other
coefficients remain unaffected. This stability is a clear indication that our methodol-
ogy is justified and that robust estimates adequately depict regular market conditions
without being much affected by other mechanisms that drive the outliers. We also re-
port in this table a generalized Hausman test proposed by Dehon et al. (2011). For all
estimations, the ordinary least squares method (an efficient but potentially inconsistent
estimation technique) systematically provides estimators which are significantly differ-
ent from robust ones. Despite a somewhat lower efficiency of the MS-methodology (28.4
per cent loss in efficiency), it seems reasonable to prefer the consistent robust estimation
technique.
In the Appendix, we provide two further tables with robustness checks. Table A.1
reports estimates based on the outlier-free subsample of the first five specifications
of Table 3.2. Point estimates of the main coefficients of interest are slightly lower in
absolute value than robust estimates on the full sample; however, all the results go in the
same direction. Estimates of price-surface elasticity are remarkably stable. Table 3.3
introduces several variations in the model specification. The first column corresponds
to the baseline specification estimated by the MS-estimator. The second column allows
for a more flexible relationship between the price and the time trend by introducing
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quadratic terms in the trend. The estimated effect of the policy reform is smaller and
less precisely estimated but remains economically significant. The third column reports
estimates on a subsample generated by eliminating all land purchases made between
January 1985 and July 1986 (i.e. transactions potentially affected by anticipating the
reform). Point estimates of the coefficient on the reform dummy increases a little
bit; which could indicate some (minor) anticipation of the reform. Specification (4)
introduces another modification to check that the anticipation effect does not seriously
affect our estimations. In this specification, we set the timing of the policy reform
on January 1, 1985: this eliminates the distinction between the starting date of the
retroactive effect of the reform and the date of the reform itself. Estimates remain
similar in terms of the signs and sizes of coefficients, and inference is not affected much.
Finally, in the specification in the last column, we impose an extremely conservative
restriction on our sample: we consider only the 75 transactions preceding January 1,
1985 and the 75 transactions immediately following the policy reform. We comfortingly
find effects similar to those found for the full sample, with slightly larger standard
errors (despite the relatively low statistical power caused by our sample restriction),
consistently with our previous findings.
Figure 3.6: Evolution of prices for different land types
Our identification is based on the policy break in 1986 and on comparing the land
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plots with similar characteristics acquired by the non-profits before and after the reform.
However, it is possible that other changes in the environment of the market for land
might have occurred around the same time. For instance, if other policy changes that
concerned all the agricultural land in the region were introduced shortly before or after
the subsidy, one would observe a pattern similar to the one that we find, but it would
be driven (at least in part) by these other policy changes. In that case, our findings
would be a poor test of the theory presented above.
To allay this concern, we have collected the data on the aggregate land market prices
for two major types of land: woodland and farm land/pastures. The markets for these
types of land are of an order of magnitude larger as compared to the market for the
land that non-profits acquire. Crucially, a very small proportion of these types of land
could qualify for the 1986 subsidy. The time series of prices comes from the Belgian
National Statistics Agency (INS, 1994), and represents average prices per hectare (from
all land transactions, by type, which are officially registered).
Figure 3.6 plots the evolution of land prices in the Walloon region, from 1979 until
1994. It depicts three series: the average price per hectare of woodlands, the average
price per hectare of farmland and pastures, and the predicted price per hectare of land
acquired by non-profits (constructed on the basis of our notary-deeds data). For clarity,
we have normalized the prices, with 1986 (the year of the reform) being the baseline.
One clearly sees that there is not a break around 1986 in prices of woodlands and farm
lands, at least not of a magnitude comparable to the predicted natural reserve land
prices. Following the pattern that we have documented above, we see that prices of
land prices purchased by non-profits first jumps, and then converges in the long-term
to the initial level).
3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 Interpretation of empirical results
Our theoretical model has generated two testable propositions. Proposition 3.2 predicts
a the differential effect of the subsidy over time: we should observe that prices of assets
bought by non-profits strongly increase in the short-run and then decrease in the long-
run as compared to this short-run peak; the quantity of assets bought should increase
unambiguously over time. Above, we have tested this prediction using data on land
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acquisitions by environmental non-profits in the Walloon region of Belgium. Properly
taking into account the presence of outliers in the data (both vertical ones and bad
leverage points) by using the MS-estimator, we show that the empirical results are in
line with this first prediction of our theoretical framework. All the parts of Proposition
3.2 are confirmed: we observe a spike in prices just after the introduction of the subsidy
(i.e. α1 > 0), followed by a progressive decline towards the initial price (α3 < 0). Even
if the effect of the subsidy on the market price vanishes over time, the number of
transactions largely increases by the end of the sample period, as shown in Figure 3.
This is fully consistent with a positive demand shock followed with a long-run expansion
of the supply curve.
Corollary 3.1 predicts a differential effect of the subsidy across non-profit types.
In particular, one should observe a relatively stronger increase in land purchases by
non-profits that give a relatively higher weight to the quantity than to the quality of
public goods provided (captured by the parameter αi in our model). In our data, the
two main non-profits have different preferences in the quantity versus quality trade-
off; these differences are made clear when one looks at their mission statements. The
mission statement of the first organization (Ardenne & Gaume) reads:
“[The association] has the objective of creating (and participating to the
creation) and managing (and participating to the management of) natural
reserves [...] and more generally of any structure, private or public, regardless
of its form, that contributes to preserving nature.”
For the second organization (R.N.O.B.), one reads:
“[The association] is devoted to preserving and managing threatened nat-
ural habitats. To this end, the association develops a strategy of purchasing
or renting land with considerable biological interest, mainly in the Walloon
and Brussels regions.”
The first non-profit seems to be more open to partnerships and its mission statement
mostly emphasizes natural reserve management efforts. Contrarily, the second state-
ment makes clear that the organization’s priority is on purchasing land. As displayed in
Figure 3.3, we can see that the second non-profit (R.N.O.B.) is purchasing the largest
number of land plots (in terms of total surface) after the reform. The market share
of each of the two non-profits changes following the introduction of the subsidy in the
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direction predicted by our model. Consequently, the subsidy makes the quantity-driven
non-profit capture virtually all the new land purchases.
This change in the market structure is consistent with corollary 3.1. In a market
with relatively few actors, one should observe that the subsidy has a relatively small
effect on the long-run price and a relatively large effect on the quantity purchased,
at the expense of less effort devoted to quality enhancement. Given that our empiri-
cal analysis focuses on only one market, we cannot compare its outcomes to those of
a less concentrated market. However, combined with information about the context
that we have discussed above, it is clear that the de facto monopsony position of the
R.N.O.B., driven by its quantity-oriented mission, induced it to engage massively in
supply-expanding prospecting activities, avoiding the free-riding that would plague a
market with multiple small prospecting non-profits. Under these conditions, the long-
run impact of the ad valorem subsidy in such a concentrated market had a huge impact
on quantities of land purchased, as we have shown previously.
Policy-wise, the relatively limited effect on prices and the long-run convergence to-
wards the pre-reform trend, combined with the large expansion in quantity purchased
might seem a positive result, given that large amounts of land were traded without
a massive price pass-through effect of taxpayers’ money to private sellers. However,
a caveat should be mentioned. As we have argued above, the less aggressive quality-
oriented buyers are driven out of the market and the market is dominated by organi-
zations that consider quantity purchased to be the priority. A negative effect of the
subsidy is that quality-enhancing management effort per unit of land is predicted to
decrease. Therefore, the ad valorem subsidy encouraging private ownership of public
goods is an efficient policy tool only if the quantity of the public good (and not its
quality) is the policy objective.
3.5.2 Econometric methodology
In our empirical investigation we implicitly assume that (at least) two different data-
generating processes (DGPs) generated our sample. This assumption is supported by
the anecdotal evidence collected during our data construction. A part of transactions
on the land market for natural reserves does not fit the classical supply-and-demand
framework. Some transactions are non-standard in the sense that public-good consid-
erations, warm-glow and persuasion play a key role in shaping the prices. Our data
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are thus “contaminated” by these observations with potentially abnormally low prices.
It is, however, impossible to disentangle the DGP of each observation a priori. Iden-
tification of other DGPs requires additional information (not observed, and, in some
cases, unobservable). This lack of information can be overcome by using robust esti-
mation techniques that allow to consistently estimate the main DGP. We opt for the
MS-estimator for four reasons: (1) it is robust to good and bad leverage points; (2)
it allows for asymmetries in outliers distribution; (3) it allows to handle categorical
variables; and (4) it has a very low break-down point of 50 per cent (i.e. the esti-
mated coefficients are consistent even when almost half of the sample is contaminated
by outliers).
Once the coefficients behind the main DGP are estimated, one can consistently
identify the outliers in the data as shown for instance in Figure 3.7. Importantly, the
identification process relies on an objective statistical procedure rather than on the a
priori of the researcher, and in case one is interested in understanding the origin of
the outliers in one’s data, this procedure offers a systematic basis for the case-study
analysis of outliers.
Figure 3.7: Outliers in specification 4 of table 3.3
More generally, this methodology might be useful in settings where different DGPs
might coexist and where other tools to grasp their co-existence are missing (provided
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that one DGP generates at least half of the data points). We believe that our method
has numerous potential applications in the empirical analyses of non-profit sector, given
that the theoretical literature agrees that the behaviour of various actors in this sector
(donors, managers, volunteer workers, etc.) is driven by a mix of classic extrinsic
high-powered incentives and intrinsic motivation (see, e.g., Benabou and Tirole (2003,
2006); Besley and Ghatak (2005b)). Standard estimation techniques might miss this
co-existence of DGPs and lead to inconsistent estimates.
3.6 Conclusion
What are the broader implications of our model and empirical findings? The frame-
work of analysis that we have developed above applies to a large set of contexts where
the provision of a public good is delegated to a non-profit organization. These are
the contexts in which a certain asset or input potentially can generate substantial ex-
ternalities or has a fundamental public-good nature, but is initially held by a private
party that value insufficiently these externalities. At the same time, there exist agents
(or organizations founded by such agents) that are intrinsically motivated and would
like to internalize these externalities or release the public-good potential of the asset.
Usually, however, these agents are credit-constrained (or, more generally, cannot easily
monetize their intrinsic motivation; so their willingness-to-pay does not fully reflect
their motivation). Thus, they can either raise funds through solicitations from other
agents, or the government can assist in transferring the ownership of the asset to these
motivated agents. Moreover, locating such assets implies a positive search cost.
One example of such a setting (beyond environmental conservation discussed above)
is the market for art. Most private non-profit organizations devoted to artistic or
cultural heritage conservation face the problem similar to the one discussed in our
paper: works of art are often held by individuals that do not fully value their public-
good nature, and such objects are traded in a competitive market. Government can
subsidize the acquisition by non-profit museums of these works of art, but finding the
art pieces that best suit the collection of the non-profit museum requires effort.
Another example is the non-profit organizations whose mission is to combat envi-
ronmental pollution by, for example, recycling polluting second-hand appliances. There
exists (relatively thin) markets for these objects. Some appliances are more polluting
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than others (e.g. they contain highly environmentally-hazardous substances); however,
given the absence of monetary incentives, some owners are unlikely to be willing to pay
the cost of bringing them to the recycling points. Thus, the non-profits often conduct
the door-to-door campaigns of searching for such appliances, which requires substantial
effort. From the policy perspective, it is important to investigate the desirability of
government subsidies for the purchase of such appliances by non-profits.
In addition, our empirical analysis has an important methodological implication.
In applied problems of evaluating the effects of government subsidies on the market
outcomes in this kind of settings, a non-negligible fraction of data points exhibit very
low prices. This occurs because some of the initial owners of the assets can also be
intrinsically motivated, and these owners would sell these assets to non-profits for a
price that does not correctly reflect the market value of the assets (i.e. a symbolic
price). In that case, failing to treat such outliers properly might induce the researcher
to underestimate the effect of the subsidy on the market price and to overestimate the
effect on the quantity. Our analysis above highlights such pitfalls and illustrates the
appropriate robust methodology for treating these outliers.
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Resolution of the Lagrangian
L(qit, xit, nit, f it , λit, νit) = qitxitω
i − λit
[
(1− σ)
(
qit
nit
)2
− µf it
]
− νit(vit − xit − f it − nit)
First order conditions:
wrt qit :
xit
ωi
= λit (1− σ)2
qit
nit
2 (3.9)
wrt xit :
ωiqitx
i
t
ωi−1
= νit (3.10)
wrt nit :
λit(1− σ)2
qit
2
nit
3 = ν
i
t (3.11)
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wrt f it :
λitµ = ν
i
t (3.12)
wrt λit :
(1− σ)
(
qit
nit
)2
= µf it (3.13)
wrt µit :
vit = x
i
t + f
i
t + n
i
t (3.14)
Use (3.12) to replace all νti by λ
i
tµ . The ratio (3.9)/(3.10) yields
xit = ω
i2
1− σ
µ
(
qit
nit
)2
(3.15)
(3.11) can be rearranged to :
nit = 2
1− σ
µ
(
qit
nit
)2
(3.16)
(3.13) can be rearranged to :
f it =
1− σ
µ
(
qit
nit
)2
(3.17)
Plugging back the three previous equations in (3.14) obtains :
vit = (3 + 2ω
i)
1− σ
µ
(
qit
nit
)2
(3.18)
Combining (3.15) and (3.18) we obtain
xit
∗
=
2ωi
3 + 2ωi
vit
Combining (3.16) and (3.18) we obtain
nit
∗
=
2
3 + 2ωi
vit (3.19)
Combining (3.17) and (3.18) we obtain
f it
∗
=
1
3 + 2ωi
vit
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Using (3.18) and (3.19) one obtains :
qit
∗
= 2
(
vit
3 + 2ωi
)3/2(
µ
1− σ
)1/2
(3.20)
Finally, by using (3.1) the equilibrium price paid by i is:
pit
∗
=
√
(3 + 2ωi)µ
(1− σ)vit
(3.21)
3.7.2 Details on the motion of volunteer hours
From any initial state vi0 we obtain
vi1 =
2
3
[
µ
(3 + 2ωi)(1− σ)v
i
0
] 1
2
vi2 =
[
2
3
[
µ
(3 + 2ωi)(1− σ)
] 1
2
] 1
2
vi0
1
22
...
vit =
[
2
3
[
µ
(3 + 2ωi)(1− σ)
] 1
2
]Στ=t−1τ=0 12t
vi0
1
2t
(3.22)
Because Στ=t−1τ=0
1
2t
=
1− 1
2t
1− 1
2
= 2− 21−t , we obtain
vit =
[
2
3
[
µ
(3 + 2ωi)(1− σ)
] 1
2
]2−21−t
vi0
2−t
3.7.3 Appended tables
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